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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Lance Darshana Kaufman 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Economics 
March 2013 
Title: Three Essays on Governance Structure in the Hospital Industry 
An important factor in the rise of health care costs is the structure and 
performance of health care markets.  This is an area in which policy can be particularly 
effective.  Health care markets are characterized by complex interactions between 
consumers, physicians, insurers, facilities, and government agencies.  Physicians, 
insurers, and facilities operate under a mix of objectives and governance structures.  The 
many varieties of objectives, and governance structures can be broadly categorized as 
for-profit, not-for-profit, and governmental.   
In the three chapters that follow I construct a theoretical framework to analyze 
hospital behavior and use a 30 year panel of data on Californian hospitals to assess the 
validity of the models and to identify the impact of governance structure on behavior.  
Chapter II addresses firm objectives.  I find that firms have a continuum of weighting 
allocations, with for-profit firms placing greater weight on profit, government firms 
placing greater weight on social objectives, and not-for-profit firms locating in a middle 
ground.  All three types of governance structures display overlap in their objectives. 
In Chapter III, I identify patterns in hospital entry and exit.  Like most 
manufacturing industries, entering hospitals are significantly smaller than incumbent 
  v  
hospitals and exiting hospitals are significantly smaller than surviving hospitals.  The 
patterns of entry and exit for hospitals vary systematically with both governance structure 
and geographic diversification. 
In Chapter IV, I develop a model of hospital entry that explains heterogeneous 
entry size and firm survival.  I find entry size to be a relatively important factor in firm 
survival.  In general entering on a larger scale increases the probability of survival.  
Despite this fact many firms enter relatively small.  The model that I develop resolves 
small entry as a rational choice for uncertain firms. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last 30 years consistently rising costs have made health care one of the 
most important economic issues in the modern US economy.  In 2009 the US spent 
approximately $2.5 trillion dollars, or 17.3% of GDP on health care.  The share of GDP 
allocated to health care is projected to continue growing over the next 10 to 20 years as 
the population ages and costs continue to increase. 
 An important factor in the rise of health care costs is the structure and 
performance of health care markets.  This is an area in which policy can be particularly 
effective.  Health care markets are characterized by complex interactions between 
consumers, physicians, insurers, facilities and government agencies.  Physicians, insurers, 
and facilities operate under a mix of objectives and governance structures.  The many 
varieties of objectives and governance structures can be broadly categorized as for-profit, 
not-for-profit, and governmental.   
The complex mix of agents and objectives make the health care market a unique 
and challenging field of exploration for economists.  Many of the traditional industrial 
organization models and findings do not readily transfer.  A significant body of research 
exists on health care markets, however there continues to be disagreement on how 
governance structure and firm objective affect firm behavior and market outcomes.  My 
research adds to the discussion by providing a systematic, theoretical and empirical 
analysis of the relationship between governance structure and hospitals. 
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An important motivation for this research is the steady and constant increase in 
healthcare costs over the last 60 years.  Figure 1. charts the slow rise of health care costs 
over time.  This research does not provide direct solutions to rising health care costs.  
Instead it develops a body of knowledge regarding the structure and behavior of hospital 
firms.  
 
 Figure 1. Spending as Percentage of GDP. Source: National Health Expenditure Data. 
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hospital behavior and use a 30 year panel of data on Californian hospitals to assess the 
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In Chapter III, I identify patterns in hospital entry and exit.  This is exploratory 
research intended to reveal the mechanisms underlying hospital behavior and identify 
fruitful avenues for further work.  Chapter III establishes many informative patterns in 
entry and exit behavior.  Among these is the existence of an important relationship 
between governance structure, multi-hospital systems and entry size.  This finding 
motivates the survival analysis presented in Chapter IV. 
In Chapter IV I develop a model of hospital entry that explains heterogeneous 
entry size and firm survival.  I find entry size to be a relatively important factor in firm 
survival.  In general entry on a larger scale increases the probability of survival.  Despite 
this fact, many firms enter relatively small.  The model that I develop resolves small 
entry as a rational choice for uncertain firms.  
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CHAPTER II 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND FIRM OBJECTIVES: A STUDY OF FOR-
PROFIT AND NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITAL BEHAVIOR  
The objective of not-for-profit firms cannot be clearly deduced from standard 
economic theory.  Yet firm objectives and behavior are critical factors in both 
government policy and consumer behavior.  This paper develops and estimates a model 
that allows firms to care for both private and public gains.  Instrumental variable 
regressions of financial data for Californian hospitals indicates that not-for-profit 
hospitals price at a lower markup than for-profit hospitals, and church-controlled 
hospitals mark up less than regular not-for-profits.   
Introduction 
Standard economic theory assumes that firms maximize profits.  The firm is 
treated as a black box that mechanically converts inputs into products for maximum 
profit.  The theoretical and empirical justification for profit maximization assumes that 
those who control firms enjoy property rights over the profits of the firm.  Remove this 
assumption, as is the case with not-for-profit firms, and the justification falls flat.  This 
raises the question that Dennis Young vocalized in 1983, “If not for profit, for what?”  
Approximately 1.4 million U. S. organizations voluntarily restrict their ability to 
distribute profits.  These organizations constitute the not-for-profit sector of our economy 
and together account for 5.5% of GDP and 9% of employment in the United States 
[Roeger, Blackwood, and Pettijohn; 2012].  Yet, the existing economic literature does not 
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provide a consistent and comprehensive theory of not-for-profit behavior.  Most 
hypothesized objectives for not-for-profit reduce to maximizing social welfare, employee 
welfare, or board member welfare.  However, in reality, most not-for-profit firms pursue 
all three objectives simultaneously [Steinberg, 2000].  Anecdotal evidence indicates that 
some not-for-profit firms are primarily profit driven and some are genuinely devoted to 
the public good [Silber, 2001].   
In this paper, I provide a theoretical and empirical argument that not-for-profit 
firms have a distribution of objectives ranging from purely self-interest to purely public 
interest.  My model of firm behavior allows the aggregation of these seemingly contrary 
objectives into a single objective function.  Under this model firms that care for both 
social welfare and private well-being exert some but not all possible market power.   
I frame the empirical model around the first-order conditions of a firm.  The 
model is estimated with data from the California hospital market.  The estimates reveal 
that not-for-profit firms are neither purely altruistic nor purely profit-seeking.  Not-for-
profit firms diﬀer significantly from for profits in their pricing behavior.  Furthermore, 
religious not-for-profits are significantly more altruistic than corporate not-for-profits.   
The hospital market is an ideal market to test this model for several reasons.  
Hospitals represent an important industry in both the not-for-profit sector and the 
economy as a whole.  Hospitals are often large firms with significant market power.  
Finally, the three major governance structures: for-profit, not-for-profit, and government, 
are all well represented in the hospital market.   
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Health care accounts for approximately 18% of U. S. GDP [National Healthcare 
Expenditure Data].  The treatment of health care is one of the most important tasks of 
modern government.  Nearly half of all not-for-profit employment in the US involves 
health care.  In comparison, the next largest field of not-for-profit employment, 
education, represents only 22%.   
The importance of hospitals is reflected in both the health care and not-for-profit 
literature.  However, this literature approaches the question of firm objective as black or 
white, with no provision for multiple objectives.  This paper contributes to the existing 
literature by identifying the heterogeneity of not-for-profit firm objectives.  Heterogeneity 
of firm objectives is important for policy, consumer, and donor decisions.   
Previous literature on the objective of not-for-profit firms two dichotomous views 
of firms, as either profit-seeking in disguise or as altruistic entities.  This research 
presents a model that unifies these views and an econometric method of estimating the 
value that firms place on each objective.   
Hospital and Not-For-Profit Background  
U. S. hospital expenditures in 2009 totaled $759.1 billion.  This was 5% of GDP 
and 31% of all health care spending [National Healthcare Expenditure Data].  While 
health care is a growing field in economics, the structure and behavior of hospitals has 
witnessed relatively little research.   
The health care market violates nearly every requirement for perfect competition.  
Asymmetric information, high search costs and cost sharing are particularly important in 
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driving the hospital market away from competitive equilibrium [Dranove and 
Satterthwaite, 2000].   
The majority of hospital services are paid through government programs and 
private insurers.  Third-party payers often exert their monopsony power to negotiate 
prices.  Town and Vistnes [2001] use proprietary HMO data to identify that hospitals’ 
negotiated pricing agreements depend upon their relative value to the HMO’s network.  
Third party payers also influence the consumer’s choice of care [Pauly, 2000].   
Medicare mandates the exact amount that may be charged for any particular 
diagnosis.  Due in part to the inflexibility of Medicare pricing, many hospitals encourage 
“up coding” diagnosis with higher associated Medicare payments.  Silverman and 
Skinner [2004] find significantly higher up coding in for profits compared to not-for-
profits.   
Hospital prices have historically been unclear.  Many hospitals have over 20,000 
prices, and a single procedure may consist of a large number of products and services.  
Further complicating matters is the common practice of price discrimination.  A 
procedure with a list price of $30,000 is charged to Medicaid for $6,000 and somewhere 
in between for private insurance groups.  Uninsured might receive the service for free or 
pay the full amount.  Transparency has received attention recently.  In 2006, the US 
department of Health and Human Services began an initiative to disclose Medicare 
payment information.  In 2003, California mandated that all hospitals provide a list of all 
charges.  However, comparison of hospitals remains diﬃcult due to inconsistencies in 
service definitions and variations in discounts and contracts.   
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Hospital administrators have suggested that a more useful method of obtaining 
price information is to contact individual hospitals [Cutland, 2005].  However, a study 
sponsored by the California Health Care Foundation [DelPo, 2005] found that only 
75.5% of inquiries resulted in an estimate, and many of the successful estimates required 
significant time and repeated inquiries.  UC Davis Medical Center uses a sliding scale 
markup to set prices.  Items which cost less than $40 are marked up 1300% while items 
which cost over $500 are marked up 250% [Lagnado, 2004].   
One result of the high variance in price for a particular service is the prevalence of 
cost shifting from low generosity payers to high generosity payers [Dor and Farley, 1996] 
This suggests that while hospitals have restricted pricing powers, they can reduce quality 
for a given service.  The existence of cost shifting suggests several important things.  
Consumers must be, to some extent, aware of varying levels of quality.  Insurers must 
either be unaware of quality, or target quality through pricing decisions.   
The public’s subsidization of not-for-profits, in the form of tax breaks, donations 
of labor and time, and legal preferences, is based on the belief that the hospital is 
providing some charitable or public good beyond what a for profit firm would oﬀer.  The 
IRS requires that not-for-profit hospitals provide some form of community benefit IRS 
[Revenue Ruling 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117].  In recent years, however, the actions of 
some not-for-profit firms have caused the public to question their integrity and intentions.  
Excessive ineﬃciency, waste and embezzlement have lowered the public trust in not-for-
profits [Silber, 2001].   
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In 2003, the General Accountability Oﬃce commissioned a study on uncompen-
sated care provided by hospitals.  In four out of five states studied, charity care as a 
percent of total care was slightly higher for not-for-profits than for profits.  However, 
California not-for-profits actually provided less uncompensated care than for profits.  In 
every state uncompensated care was concentrated in a small group of hospitals.  The top 
quartile of Californian hospitals devoted 7.2% of expenses to uncompensated care while 
the bottom quartile devoted 1.4%.  This suggests possible behavioral diﬀerences within 
not-for-profit hospitals.   
Two types of information asymmetries are important in the hospital market.  
Medical providers are more knowledgeable than patients regarding possible treatments 
and outcomes.  This results in over treatment or poor quality of treatment.  In addition, 
both patients and providers know more about the benefits of treatment than insurers do.  
Medicare up coding is just one of many examples of how hospitals utilize information 
asymmetry.   
Three bodies of literature are important to this study: theory of not-for-profits, 
hospital competition and mixed market oligopolies.  The theories of not-for-profit firms 
inform my research in two ways.  The motivation of not-for-profit entrepreneurs directly 
aﬀects the firm’s objective.  The behavior of consumers and their preferences over firm 
type should be considered in any mixed firm competition.   
Many neoclassical economists struggle to explain why not-for-profits are a useful 
firm structure.  Hansmann [1980] suggests that the non-distribution constraint of not-for-
profits remedies agency problems and asymmetric information.  In the case of hospitals, 
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the level and quality of care may be unobservable by donors and patients.  If this is the 
case, the profit motive may induce hospitals to provide sub optimal levels of service and 
extract the cost savings as profit.   
Ortmann and Schlesinger [1997] object to the acceptance of this trust hypothesis 
on the grounds that repetition makes firms care about their track record.  The 
maintenance of this trust depends on the degree to which managers are allowed to extract 
non-monetary profits.  Not-for-profit firms that succeed in developing trust create 
opportunities for rents through its exploitation.  Historically, many firms violate the non-
distribution constraint [Silber, 2001].  Weisbrod [1998] notes that the non-distribution 
constraint is costly to enforce.  It is particularly diﬃcult to identify the extraction of 
profits in small firms.   
The non-distribution constraint may also function as a signal to stakeholders of 
the firms altruistic motives.  Because of this signal consumers may be more tolerant of 
price discrimination by non profit firms [Hansmann, 1981].   
The US government has sponsored several recent inquiries into the community 
benefit of hospitals.  The Congressional Budget Oﬃce [CBO 2006] reports that there is 
little consensus on measures for community benefit.  One of the most common measures, 
uncompensated care, is a poor measure because it does not distinguish between bad debt 
and service to the indigent.  A result of the present study is that one of the more 
significant diﬀerences in cost allocation between for-profits and not-for-profits is cost 
allocation to billing and collections.   
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The CBO also found that not-for-profits were more likely to provide less 
profitable services.  Such services include emergency room care, labor and delivery, 
intensive burn care, and high level trauma.   
In 2006, the Government Accountability Oﬃce surveyed executive compensation 
at not-for-profit hospitals.  This survey focused on governance structure, basis for com-
pensation and internal controls.  Not-for-profit hospital systems have similar governance 
structures and compensation policies.  Executive compensation is often based on com-
parable markets and decided by committee; however, policies regarding employment 
perks such as entertainment and travel expenses varied considerably [GAO, 2006].   
A GAO report from 2008 analyzed hospitals from 4 states and found that commu-
nity benefit practices varied significantly by state and hospital size.  This may be due, in 
part, to the fact that state tax exempt requirements vary substantially.  Hospital specific 
definitions of community benefit lead to large variance in reported levels of community 
benefit [GAO, 2008].   
Hospitals contribute to the community through uncompensated care, medical ed-
ucation, research and community programs.  The IRS [2007] estimates that these 
respectively account for 56%, 23%, 15%, and 6% of community benefit expenditure by 
not-for-profit hospitals.  However, hospitals may provide additional indirect benefit to the 
community through lower prices and provision of unprofitable services.   
Not-for-profits often provide some public good.  Weisbrod [1975] suggests that 
non-profits may provide public goods when both for profit and government sector fail to 
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provide adequate levels.  Market failures are relatively well understood.  Government 
failures occur when a subgroup of the population has a marginal utility for the public 
good that exceeds that demanded by the general populace.  For example, the wealthy may 
have a higher willingness to pay for the care of the indigent than the poor.   
Cynics suggest that not-for-profits are simply wolves in sheep’s clothing.  Not-
for-profit firms may enjoy both demand and cost advantages over for profits.  Firms find 
ways of avoiding the non-distribution constraint through perks, salaries and self-dealing 
[Pauly and Redisch, 1973].  Tax advantages, preferential government and legal treatment 
and greater consumer demand give not-for-profit firms competitive advantages  
The entrepreneur is likely guided by a mixture of motivations.  Young [1983] 
identifies various intrinsic motivations of the entrepreneur.  These motivations play an 
important role in firm structure and organizational values.  Stakeholder theory suggests 
that organizational behavior is influenced not just by the entrepreneur, but by all 
stakeholders of a firm.  The degree of power which consumers, payers, workers, 
managers, board members, donors and suppliers have determines to a large degree the 
behavior of the firm.  This lends credence to my earlier observation that subgroups of not-
for-profits may have diﬀerent objectives.   
The hospital literature generally defines the hospital market as a diﬀerentiated 
oligopoly.  Hospitals compete on the basis of price, quality, services and location.  The 
standard method of defining price is as average revenue per discharge [Keelera and 
Zwanzigerc, 1999, Lynk and Neumann, 1999, Lynk, 1995, Dranove and Ludwick, 1999].  
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This definition is imperfect because it ignores variation in severity of diagnosis and 
quality of treatment [Dranove and Ludwick, 1999].   
The theoretical eﬀect of regulated pricing [Dor and Farley, 1996] and competition 
[to Ma and Burgess, 1993, Brekke et al., 2006, Lyon, 1999] is relatively well accepted, 
and the general agreement is that competition enhances quality.  However, empirical 
research presents strong evidence both for [Kessler and McClellan, 2000] and against 
[Propper et al., 2008] this statement.  Propper et al. [2008] suggests that unobserved 
quality is reduced, while observed quality increases with competition.  The heterogeneity 
of not-for-profit firm objectives is consistent with these mixed results.   
Town and Vistnes [2001] find that HMOs base contracting decisions on hospital 
facilities, services and location.  The consumer often values proximity, but is willing to 
trade oﬀ proximity for perceived quality.   
The mixed oligopoly literature consists mainly of game theoretic approaches to 
competition between public and private firms.  The original purpose of the literature was 
to examine the welfare consequences of state owned firms competing in the market place 
with private enterprise.  More specifically, it asks when the existence of a public firm can 
return oligopoly markets to the socially eﬃcient level of production [de Fraja and 
Delbono, 1990].  With the decline of state owned industries in the 80s and 90s, this 
literature lost its original purpose.  However, it still serves as a useful guide to 
understanding how not-for-profit firms may operate.   
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The hospital market most closely resembles the Hotelling-type models of Mat-
sumura and Matsushima [2003, 2004], Cremer et al. [1991].  Matsumura and Matsushima 
[2004] identifies a pattern that is particularly interesting in its application to hospitals.   
The hospital industry is one of the more substantial segments of our economy.  
However, the behavior of hospitals is still poorly understood.  The health literature does 
not have a consistent explanation of hospital competition and the not-for-profit literature 
disagrees upon the purpose and objectives of not-for-profit firms.  The next section 
proposes a model that unites these two literatures and explains their contrary findings.   
A Model of the Hospital Industry  
Consumers’ decisions to consume a hospital service depends on the extent to 
which the service improves their health, the costs of the service, and the side benefits of 
consuming the service.  The degree to which hospital service can improve health depends 
on individual and hospital specific factors.   
Current health status is one of the most important factors aﬀecting the health 
outcomes of hospital care.  An individual’s behavior before and after hospital service will 
aﬀect the health outcomes of the hospital service.  Quality of care varies significantly 
between hospitals.  Qualitative factors include cleanliness, staﬀ ability and workload, and 
information management practices.  The match between types of hospital services and 
health issues also aﬀects outcomes.   
The costs of service depend on type of insurance, hospital prices, distance to 
hospital, and type, length, and quantity of service.  The opportunity cost of service can be 
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thought of as the health benefit of alternate hospitals and or procedures.  A portion of a 
hospital’s expenses may not significantly influence health outcomes.  For example, 
landscaping, architectural embellishments, and entertainment services are usually used to 
increase consumer’s enjoyment of treatment rather than health outcomes.   
Individuals maximize utility by choosing among all available hospitals.  The 
quantity demanded for a hospital depends on the characteristics of all the other hospitals.  
The quantity an individual demands from hospital h therefore depends on individual 
characteristicsܫ௛, the characteristics of all hospitals ܪ and prices of all hospitals ܲ.  This 
suggests hospitals face the following inverse demand curve 
௛ܲכ ൌ ݌ሺܳ,ܪ, ܫ௛ሻ 
Where ܲ_݄ is the price of hospital h, Q is a vector of quantities for hospitals in the 
market, ܫ is a vector of population characteristics, and H is a set of vectors of hospital 
characteristics for each hospital in the market.   
This research provides both for-profit and not-for-profit firms the ability to care 
about private profit and social welfare.  Many firms are observed to provide charitable 
services to the community.  While this can be claimed to be a strategic choice to 
maximize long run firm value, economists have identified cases where shareholder 
preferences are not congruent with the assumption of pure profit maximization [Benninga 
and Muller, 1979, Jensen and John B. Long, 1972].  In addition to the shareholder theory 
of the firm, many corporations, such as Google and eBay, follow a stakeholder man-
agement system [R.  Edward Freeman, 2004].  According to Freeman, stakeholder theory 
suggests that firm objective functions include non financial arguments.   
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Not-for-profit firms that wish to expand operations must either price above 
marginal cost or petition donors and granters for funds.  In addition to seeking profits to 
fuel growth, many not-for-profits actually behave as for-profits in disguise.  Examples 
exist across all industries in the not-for-profit sector of not-for-profit firms distributing 
profits in hidden ways.  Young [1983] conducted extensive case studies of entrepreneurs 
and found that the objectives that a firm pursues are closely related to the preferences of 
the entrepreneur directing the firm.  Young’s finding suggests that firms seek to maximize 
an objective function that includes other arguments in addition to profit.  Thus, firms 
maximize a utility function of the form 
ܷ ൌ ܷሺߨ, ܺሻ. 
Where π is firm profit and X is a vector of characteristics regarding the state of the 
world.  If markets are perfect maximizing any objective function is equivalent to 
maximizing profit.  However, if profit maximization results in deadweight loss through 
market power or externalities maximizing profits may result in an inferior outcome for 
the firm.  It is impractical to model all characteristics that a firm could have preferences 
over.  Three factors seem particularly relevant to hospitals: social welfare, quantity of 
output, and reputation.  Social welfare is a relevant argument because hospitals, 
particularly not-for-profit and government hospitals, are thought to play an important role 
in the welfare of the communities.  Individuals who work at hospitals often place value 
on helping people.  Administrators may be more concerned about the quantity of 
individuals served.  This would suggest that nonprofit firms cross subsidize to achieve a 
quantity greater quantity of service.   
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In this paper I assume that firms have preferences over profit and market surplus 
alone.   
ܷ ൌ ܷሺߨ௛,ܯܵሻ 
where 
ߨ௛ ൌ ௛ܲܳ௛ െ ܥሺܪ௛ܳ௛ሻ 
ܯܵ ൌ෍ ௛ܲሺܳ,ܪ, ܫሻ െ ܥ௛ሺܪ௛, ܳ௛ሻ௛  
with first order conditions  
߲ܷ
߲ߨ
݀ߨ
݀ܳ௛ ൅
߲ܷ
߲ܯܵ
݀ܯܵ
݀ܳ௛ ൌ 0 
If the solution is not a corner solution, the marginal utility of profit with respect to 
quantity is equal to the marginal utility of Social Welfare with respect to quantity.   
For example, consider the simple case of a single firm with a single product, 
linear demand and linear cost:  
ܷ ൌ ܷሺߨ௛,ܯܵሻ ൌ ߙߨ௛ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߙሻܯܵ 
ܲ ൌ ܽ െ ܾܳ 
ܥ ൌ ܿܳ 
ߨ ൌ ܲܳ െ ܿܳ 
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ܯܵ ൌ ሺܽ െ ܿሻܳכ െ ܾ2ܳ
כଶ 
The first-order condition for utility maximization is:  
ܽ െ ܿ െ ሺ1 ൅ ߙሻܾܳ ൌ 0 
and the price quantity solution is  
ܳכ ൌ ܽ െ ܿሺ1 ൅ ߙሻܾ 
ܲכ ൌ ߙܽ ൅ ܿ1 ൅ ߙ  
The standard assumption for for-profit firms is that firms maximize profit.  This 
would correspond to α = 1 and I would have monopoly pricing.  The pure not-for-profit, 
social welfare maximizing firm would correspond to α = 0.  This results in competitive 
equilibrium.   
Rewriting the first order condition and substituting in price gives 
ܲ ൌ ܿ ൅ ߙܾܳ 
This pricing relation is equivalent to the oligopoly pricing relation frequently used 
to estimate the markup ratio, with the weight placed on profit being equivalent to the 
markup ratio.   As the firm becomes more concerned about social welfare, the markup 
decreases and the market becomes more competitive.   
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Data Sources, Variables, and Descriptions  
In this study, I estimate the influence of ownership on hospital pricing decisions.  
The purpose of this research is to determine how firm objectives diﬀer across 
government, for profit and not-for-profit hospitals.   
The primary source of the hospital data is the Oﬃce of Statewide Health Planning 
and Development (OSHPD).  OSHPD conducts an annual financial survey of all acute 
care hospitals licensed in the state of California.  The survey began in 1976 and has been 
conducted every year since.  The survey identifies ownership type, hospital utilization 
and capacity, revenue, expenses, and balance sheet activity.   
The endogenous variables used in this study are price and quantity.  Hospitals 
provide a large variety of services, and the price of any individual service varies with the 
severity of the case, the method of payment, and outcomes of negotiations between the 
payer and the hospital.  I follow the previous literature and construct price as average 
revenue per patient [Town and Vistnes, 2001].  Quantity is defined as total patient census 
days.  A patient census day is a unit of measure denoting service to a single inpatient 
between the hours of two consecutive census-taking hours.   
The exogenous variables are patient census days, hospital discharges, capacity, 
wages, per capita personal income, population and insurance level.  Patient census days, 
hospital discharges, capacity and wages are reported for each hospital service.  Sixty 
hospital services are reported.  Few hospitals provided all Sixty services.  I focus on 
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general acute surgery because it is provided by the majority of hospitals and constitutes a 
significant portion of hospital revenues.   
Table 1 contains the means and standard errors for the data.  Two sided t-tests 
indicate that means of most variables for not-for-profits are significantly diﬀerent than 
both for-profit and government hospitals.   
Table 0.1 2.1 
Table 1:  Variable Means and Standard Errors 
Not-For-Profit  For-Profit  Government 
Variable   Mean  SD  Mean  SE  Mean   SE 
Price   706.7   9.8   643.3 13.1  598.2   17.3  
Quantity   24797  493   13202 402  17850   1114  
Population   3.2   0.10  5.2  0.17  1.2   0.08  
Income   17.1   0.12  16.8  0.13  15.0   0.18  
Capacity   132.5   2.41  80.6  1.86  93.5   5.42  
Residual Quantity   591062 19378 991213 3828  317881  
 
24138  
Expense Per Unit   198.9   2.59  191.7 7.40  208.4   4.56  
Wage: 
Management   19.7   0.10  18.5  0.17  18.2   0.21  
Registered Nurse   16.7   0.09  15.4  0.12  15.2   0.13  
Vocational Nurse   10.4   0.10  9.8  0.08  9.5   0.09  
Aides   7.0   0.04  6.5  0.05  6.4   0.08  
Tables 2 and 3 provide the distribution of hospital type and ownership.  The 
distribution of ownership type varies by type of care.  Not-for-profits account for 80 of 81 
short term childrens hospitals but none of the 16 long term childrens hospitals are not-for-
profit.  Nearly 76% of observations are short term general care hospitals.  Because 
psychiatric and other specialty hospitals likely have diﬀerent operating characteristics, I 
restrict the data to short term general care hospitals.   
Hospital observations range from 1997 to 2005.  The number of licensed hospitals 
in California fluctuates around 350 before 2003 and drops to 320 after 2003.   
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Table 0.2 2.2 
Table 2: Primary Type of Care 
Frequency 
Proportion 
(%)
Long-Term 
Children   16  0.40
Long-Term General  189  4.69
Long-Term 
Psychiatric  61  1.51
Long-Term 
Specialty   83  2.06
Short-Term 
Children   81  2.01
Short-Term 
General   3,045  75.48
Short-Term 
Psychiatric  397  9.84
Short-Term 
Specialty   162  4.01
Total   4,034  100
 
Table 0.32.3 
Table 3: Hospital Governance Structure 
Frequency 
Proportion 
(%)
Church   365  9.05
Nonprofit Corp.   1,628  40.36
Nonprofit Other   134  3.32
City   9  0.22
City/County   42  1.04
County   278  6.89
District   413  10.24
State   91  2.26
Investor, Corp.   978  24.24
Investor, 
Partnership   87  2.16
Investor, 
Individual   9  .22
Total   4,034  100
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This continues a downward trend documented by Shuﬄer et al. (2001).  The drop 
was due primarily to a large number of for-profit corporation closures in 2003.  The type 
of care for hospitals that closed was representative of the population.   
The report period for the survey years is the hospitals fiscal year, with 6.9% of the 
observations reporting data for less than a full year, 92.4% reporting a full year and 0.7% 
of observations reporting for more than 365 days.  An observation might not report a full 
year due to accounting changes, startups and closures.  I exclude observations that report 
less or more than a full year.   
My restrictions reduce the sample from 4051 to 3045 observations.  The t-tests 
indicate significant diﬀerences between excluded and included data for all variables 
except price, population and income.   
Of hospitals reporting a full year, 42.4% use a fiscal year beginning January 1, 
and 42.5% use a fiscal year beginning July 1 with the remainder distributed across the 
other 10 months.  The BEA provides annual county level estimates of personal income 
and population.  I constructed a weighted of county personal income and population for 
each hospital year.  For observations beginning in the first 15 days of the month, I used 
the entire beginning month in the weight.  For those beginning after the first 15 days of 
the month I used the entire ending month in the weight.   
A cursory examination of the data reveals large and significant diﬀerences in the 
characteristics of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals.  The fact that not-for-profit 
hospitals tend to be larger than for-profit hospitals and operate in smaller markets 
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suggests that they have greater market power than for-profits.  This observation is critical 
in the interpretation of the empirical results.  It identifies that relatively lower markups 
for not-for-profit firms is not due to lower market power.  Not-for-profits have greater 
capacity and wages.  This suggests a smaller profit motive.  These observations are 
consistent with for profits being more motivated by profit and not-for-profits being more 
motivated by social welfare.   
Empirical Applications  
The empirical work seeks to determine whether the marginal rate of substitution 
between profit and welfare varies systematically with governance structure.  The em-
pirical model below modifies the model presented in section 3.  The empirical model was 
estimated and the results are presented.   
Empirical Model  
I estimate two models.  In the first case I assume linear demand and constant 
marginal cost with a demand function given by:  
ܳ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߙଶ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߙଷܴ௜௧ ൅ ߳௜௧ 
where ܳ௜௧ is the quantity demanded from hospital i in year t, ௜ܲ௧ is the price of hospital 
service, ௜ܺ௧ is a vector of hospital and population characteristics that shift demand and ܴ௜௧ 
is the residual demand in the hospital’s market.  Constant marginal cost gives rise to the 
pricing relation given by:  
௜ܲ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܹ ൅ ߙଵߠܳ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
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with ܹ represents wage and ߠ represents the firm markup.   
In the second model, I relax the assumption of constant returns to scale.  
However, with equation (4) ߠ is not identified.  To resolve this, I use the demand 
equation  
ܳ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ߙଶ ௜ܲ௧ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߙଷܴ௜௧ ൅ ߳௜௧ 
 
with the pricing relation  
௜ܲ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܹ ൅ ߚଶܳ௜௧ ൅ ߙଵߠ ௜ܺ௧ܳ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
If every firm has monopoly power in their market, the estimate for ߠ can be 
interpreted as an estimate of the weight that the firm gives to social welfare in its 
objective function.   
Results 
The models were estimated for general acute surgery.1  General acute surgery 
accounts for 47.2% of total census days in the median hospital.  Quantity is defined as 
total patient census days.2  Price is defined as average total revenue per patient census 
day.  The model was estimated using two stage least squares regression.  Table 4 
                                                            
1  Also referred to as Unspecified General Acute Care (GAC); i.e., beds not designated as perinatal, 
pediatric, ICU, CCU, acute respiratory, burn center, ICNN, or acute rehabilitation.   
 
2  A patient census day is the number of days that inpatients (excluding newborns in the nursery) are 
hospitalized.  The day of admission, but not the day of discharge, is counted as a patient day.  If both 
admission and discharge occur the same day, the day is counted as one patient day.   
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provides the estimation results for the demand equation (4) in columns 1-3 and (6) in 
column 4.  Price is instrumented with direct per unit expense.  In column 4 per unit 
expense interacted with income provides the second instrument.  This interaction is used 
to identify the scale parameter. 
Table 0.42.4 
Table 4: Demand Equation Estimates 
Basic 
Hospital Fixed 
Effects 
All Demand 
Shifters DRTS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Price  -31.122  -15.309   -20.721  -117.289 
(2.17)** (2.74)*** (1.92)* (2.33)** 
Residual 
Quantity  0.017   0.001   -0.001   0.02 
(6.48)*** (-0.96)   (-0.85)   
(4.08)***
Year 
 
2607.518  1541.944   2232.847 3827.586 
(2.90)*** (4.27)*** (2.72)*** (2.30)** 
County 
Population  -2.884   -0.024   -0.347   -3.502 
(4.89)*** (-0.12)   (-1.37)   
(2.96)***
Per Capita 
Income       -339.246  1.396 
    (-1.64) (2.72)*** 
Health 
Insurance       -3719.712 
    (-1.13)  
Age   116.954 
(-0.26)  
Price*Income    0.239 
(2.29)** 
Observations   2766   2766   2044   2766 
Governance 
Dummies   No   No   Yes   Yes 
Firm Dummies   No   Yes   Yes   No 
R-squared   0.96   0.95 
F  25.3  142.24   99.14   14.56 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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In all specifications for demand, price is negative and statistically significant.  
Column 1 is a basic estimate of demand, and includes a time trend, county population as 
a demand shifter and residual quantity as a proxy for health characteristics of the county.  
Column 2 adds firm level fixed eﬀects.  This accounts for variations in demand due to 
both firm characteristics and unobserved population characteristics.  Firm fixed eﬀects 
greatly enhance the accuracy of the price estimate.   
Column 3 introduces for-profit and not-for-profit dummies as well as additional 
demand shifters for county income, age, and percent insured.  The governance dummies 
indicate that government hospitals generate a larger quantity than nonprofit and for profit 
hospitals.  Due to small samples and confidentiality restrictions health insurance data 
from some counties are not present.  This restricts the sample size from 2766 to 2044.  
The direct eﬀect of health insurance should be to increase demand through moral hazard, 
a reduction in the marginal price of health care.  However, insurance is also correlated 
with wealthier populations that have healthier lifestyles.  The positive age coeﬃcient is 
consistent with the fact that the age distribution of hospital admissions is skewed toward 
the elderly.  The lack of significance of this variable is likely due to the method of linear 
interpolation of missing census years.  
 
The model estimated in Column 4 interacts price with per capita income.  Price is 
often a signal of quality.  For individuals with high incomes, the signaling eﬀect of price 
leads to higher demand.  In column 1-3, ∂q/∂p is constant and equal to the price 
coeﬃcient.  However, in column 4 ∂q/∂p = α1 + α2Xit Under the estimates of column 4, 
∂q/∂p has a mean of −94.05 and a standard deviation of 6.46.   
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Both pricing relations instrument quantity with income and population.  Table 5 
contains the estimates for the constant returns to scale pricing relation (5).  The estimates 
for θ are calibrated with the point estimate for ∂q/∂p from Table 5 column 1.  Because the 
pricing relation is homogeneous of degree one in markup, the alternate estimates for 
∂q/∂p would proportionally scale the estimates for θs but would have no eﬀect on any 
other estimates.   
Table 0.52.5 
Table 5: Pricing Relation Estimates Constant Returns to Scale 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Quantity*Gov -15.24978 -14.62734 -10.8927 -16.49466 
ߠீ௢௩ 0.49   0.47   0.35   0.53 
(15.84)*** (11.88) (10.87)*** (11.90)***
Quantity*FP 
ߠி௉ 0.83   0.8   0.46   1.01 
(12.09)*** (7.69) (5.87)*** (8.30)*** 
Quantity*NP 
ߠே௉ 0.55   0.51   0.27   0.52 
(16.68)*** (10.08) (6.47)*** (8.45)*** 
Direct Expence Per Unit  0.7   0.62   0.11   0.19 
(11.88)*** (9.26) (-1.51)   (2.16)** 
Management      3.93   -6.25 
     (-1.28)   (-1.59) 
Registered Nurse      38.49   34.11 
     (8.63)*** (5.99)*** 
Vocational Nurse  0.04   5.58 
  (-0.01)   (-1.28) 
Aides  43.81   -16.6 
  (4.80)*** (-1.17) 
Observations  2766   2044   1759   1759 
Pr[NP = Gov]  0.04** 0.24 
< 
0.001*** 0.61 
Pr[NP = FP] 
< 
0.001*** 
< 
0.001*** 
< 
0.001*** 
< 
0.001*** 
F  105.28   60.16   119.47   23.34 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Markup is calculated by dividing the slope estimate for quantity by the slope 
estimate for price. 
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Table 6 provides estimates for a specification that allows for decreasing returns to 
scale in the pricing relation.  Table 2.6 markup estimates are the coeﬃcients on the 
partial of the vectors ሺߙଵ  ൅ ߙଶ ௜ܺ௧ሻܳ௜௧ܩ௜ where ܩ௜ is a governance dummy matrix.  
While the estimates of this pricing relation vary with the estimate of ߲ݍ/߲݌, the estimates 
are robust to diﬀerent demand specifications.   
Table 0.62.6 
Table 6: Pricing Relation Estimates Non-constant Returns to Scale 
(1) (2) (3) 
Quantity  0.005   0.024   0.052 
(3.08)*** (4.43)*** (3.92)*** 
Income*Quantity*Gov -4.808849 -13.722813 -10.204143 
ߠீ௢௩ 0.041   0.117   0.087 
(5.57)*** (6.56)*** (2.66)*** 
Income*Quantity*FP -7.858363 -17.710639 -19.235396 
ߠி௉ 0.067   0.151   0.164 
(7.51)*** (5.96)*** (4.82)*** 
Income*Quantity*NP -3.870537 -13.253657 -9.852276 
ߠே௉ 0.033   0.113   0.084 
(5.37)*** (5.85)*** (2.79)*** 
Direct Expence Per Unit  0.24   0.104   0.146 
(3.58)*** (1.06)   (-1.05) 
Management  2.441   -11.206   -24.743 
(-0.98)   (2.05)** (3.20)*** 
Registered Nurse  29.647   32.901   27.185 
(7.75)*** (5.81)*** (3.22)*** 
Vocational Nurse  1.962   6.164   11.993 
(-0.58)   (-1.17)   (1.68)* 
Aides  24.264   8.716   -17.074 
(2.93)*** (-0.65)   (-0.87) 
Capacity    -7.347   -11.765 
 (5.14)*** (5.75)*** 
 No   No   Yes 
Observations  2307   2307   2307 
Pr[NP = Gov]  0.06 0.58   0.75 
Pr[NP = FP] < 0.001*** < 0.001*** < 0.001*** 
F  143.19   57.76   6.71 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Markup is calculated by dividing the slope estimate for income*quantity by the 
slope estimate for price. 
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The F tests for equality of not-for-profit and for profit markups find statistically 
significant difference at the 1% level in all 7 specifications.  Under columns 1 and 3 of 
table 5 and column 1 of table 6 not-for-profit and government markups are significantly 
diﬀerent.  Not-for-profits do not exert market power to the same extent as for-profits, 
however they do not display the behavior of a purely social welfare maximizing firm.  
The data indicate that not-for-profit firms tend to locate in less competitive markets.  
Therefore the lower markup of not-for-profit hospitals is not due to an inability to aﬀect 
prices, but rather an intentional choice not to.  
To test the hypothesis that, within the designation of not-for-profit, firms behave 
differently, I modify the specification to allow θ to vary within not-for-profit firms.  The 
results from these estimations are presented in table 7.  Hospitals controlled by churches 
have a significantly smaller markup compared to hospitals controlled by not-for-profit 
corporations.  This is consistent with my model.  If an entrepreneur wished to found a 
not-for-profit with the intention of extracting profits, he or she would choose to organize 
outside of the church framework.   
Conclusions and Caveats 
This paper proposed a model of homogeneous firm objectives.  This model was 
tested by examining the supply and demand for general acute surgery in Californian 
hospitals between 1997 and 2005.  The empirical results in this paper support the 
hypothesis that not-for-profit firms have both a welfare maximizing motive and a profit-
seeking motive.  Furthermore, some not-for-profits place a greater weight on social 
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welfare than others.  As a group, church-based not-for-profits have a lower markup ratio 
than corporate not-for-profits.   
Table 0.72.7 
Table 7: Markup Estimates By Type of Not-For-Profit 
(1) (2) 
ߠீ௢௩ 0.2   0.32 
(10.85)***  
(12.96)*** 
ߠி௉ 0.28   0.71 
(5.84)***  (9.97)*** 
ߠே௉ ஼௛௨௥௖௛ 0.18   0.33 
(7.03)***  (9.34)*** 
ߠே௉ ஼௢௥௣ 0.21   0.39 
(8.05)***  
(11.24)*** 
ߠே௉ ை௧௛௘௥ 0.19   0.25 
(9.63)***  (9.25)*** 
Pr ሾߠே௉ ஼௛௨௥௖௛ ൌ ߠே௉ ஼௢௥௣ሿ   0.07* 
< 
0.001*** 
Pr ሾߠே௉ ஼௛௨௥௖௛ ൌ ߠே௉ ை௧௛௘௥ሿ   0.53   0.01*** 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
Further research is needed to accurately explain why markups vary.  While the 
results are consistent with my model, other explanations, such as systematic diﬀerences 
in market power, diﬀerences in fund raising ability, and cross subsidization of products 
are also valid explanations of the findings.   
Not-for-profit hospitals may face a trade oﬀ between low markup ratios, 
uncompensated care and other community benefits.  A complete analysis of not-for-profit 
firms should include pricing behavior, market demand, government/community support 
and competition when analyzing community benefit.  This research primarily addresses 
pricing behavior.    
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CHAPTER III 
PATTERNS OF ENTRY AND EXIT IN THE CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL MARKET:  
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND INDUSTRY EVOLUTION IN A SERVICE 
INDUSTRY 
The ownership structure of service industries differs greatly from manufacturing.  
Service industries have a much greater predominance of not-for-profit and government 
owned organizations.  In addition the highly geographic nature of services encourages 
systems of firms linked through common ownership or common operating methods.  
These characteristics play a substantial, but poorly understood, role in the behavior of 
firms and the operations of markets.  This paper uses the hospital industry to demonstrate 
that that governance structure and system membership are important factors in the entry 
and exit decisions of firms.  It provides a framework and direction for studying the role of 
governance structure and system membership by revealing how firms with different 
ownership structures enter and exit.  I find that entry and exit patterns, including entry 
and exit rates vary systematically with governance structure and system membership. 
Introduction 
In their seminal study on firm entry and exit, Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson 
(1988) characterized the entry and exit patterns of US manufacturing firms.  The study 
brought to light numerous patterns in the entry and exit of firms.  They find that 
diversifying firms enter markets with relatively larger sizes than new firms.  They also 
find that firms grow in relative size as they age.  This study continues to inform research 
today.  Their study focused on manufacturing, which has experienced steady and long 
term decline in the United States.   
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In this paper, I focus on patterns of entry and exit in the hospital market, a 
significant service sector industry.  The service sector has experienced growth in recent 
years.  Service industries function through fundamentally different mechanisms than 
manufacturing (Audretsch, Klomp, Santarelli, and Thurik 2004).  Audretsh et al. find that 
Gibrat's law holds for small scale services, while it fails in a systematic manner in 
manufacturing industries.  A number of empirical studies of service industries (Audretsch 
et al. 2004, Harhoff; Stahl, and Woywode 1998, Santarelli 1998) point to Dunne, 
Roberts, and Samuelson (1988).  To my knowledge, there are no studies that document 
the entry and exit patterns in service industries.  Because of this it is unknown how 
applicable the findings of Dunne et al. are to empirical service industry research. 
There are two striking differences between service industries and manufacturing 
industries.  The first difference is the presence of multiple forms of firm governance.  
Not-for-profit and government owned firms are virtually unknown in the manufacturing 
industries.  The second major difference is the geographic nature of service markets.  
Service firms have relatively small market areas and typically expand by acquiring 
geographic space while manufacturing firms expand by increasing the product space or 
capacity.  This aspect of the service industries is readily seen by the predominance of 
franchises within the service sector.   
I extend Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson's study to the service sector by analyzing 
the patterns of entry and exit of Californian inpatient hospitals.  I introduce firm 
governance structure and system membership as important differentiating characteristics.  
I find that the hospital industry shares some characteristics with manufacturing industries, 
however differs in a number of important aspects.  Like most manufacturing industries, 
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entering hospitals are significantly smaller than incumbent hospitals and exiting hospitals 
are significantly smaller than surviving hospitals.  The major differences between entry 
and exit patterns of hospitals compared to manufacturing industries relate to governance 
structure and system membership.  I find that the patterns of entry and exit for hospitals 
vary systematically with both governance structure and geographic diversification 
(system membership).  The nature of system membership in the service industry is 
significantly different than the manufacturing industry.  I find that system membership 
gives both diversifying and new firms a significant advantage over single hospital firms.  
This advantage is manifested through larger relative entry size and lower exit rates.  
While my result is consistent with manufacturing industries, the advantage that system 
hospitals experience greatly outstrips the advantage that system membership affords 
manufacturing industries.   
Governance structure is an attribute that is largely unexplored within 
manufacturing industries.  Hospital for-profit firms have much greater entry and exit rate 
than not-for-profit firms.  If entry is purely a response to market opportunity for-profit 
firms and not-for-profit firms would enter at proportionately similar rates.   
 I also identify system membership as an important factor in firm outcomes.  
System membership is associated with greater revenue, higher profit and lower exit rates.  
Over the last 30 years there has been a steady shift in the distribution of hospitals from 
independently run to system hospitals.  My findings on system membership identify 
system membership as an important topic of future research in the service sector.   
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 The hospital market has significant variation in both system membership and 
governance structure.  This makes the hospital market the ideal place to begin identifying 
how the services differ from manufacturing.  The value of this research extends beyond 
the industrial organization insights regarding the services, governance and geographic 
expansion. 
 Indeed, the provision of health care is one of the most prominent problems facing 
modern economies.  In 2009, United States health care expenses accounted for 17.6% of 
GDP, roughly $8,086 per person.  Increases in health care costs have outpaced inflation 
for over a half a century.  Hospital expenses constitute the largest portion of health care 
spending and are consistently identified as one of the driving forces behind the growth in 
health care costs.  Many professionals believe that structural problems within the health 
care market, such as excess market share and quality competition, are responsible for the 
rapid increase in hospital expenses.  However, despite a significant amount of research 
into hospital markets over the last three decades, relatively little is known about how 
hospitals enter and exit markets.   
 To remedy this shortcoming, I conduct a detailed analysis of the evolution of 
entry and exit in the California hospital market between 1976 and 2008.  The data are the 
most long-lived and detailed data on hospitals used in the literature.  It consists of 
detailed financial and operating data for the universe of inpatient hospitals in California 
between 1976 and 2008. 
This study covers a period of significant turnover in the hospital market.  I 
identify yearly entry and exit rates averaging 9.5% and 10.5% respectively.  The number 
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of inpatient hospitals in California has decreased 28%, from 627 in 1976 to 451 in 2008.  
In addition the number of firms operating hospitals has decreased 44% from 435 to 246.  
This is particularly striking considering that California's population increased over 50% 
during the same time period. 
Coinciding with the decrease in hospital facilities and an increase in average 
hospital capacity and proportion of hospitals affiliated with multi-hospital systems.  
Hospital systems can be thought of as the hospital equivalent of multi-plant 
manufacturers.  Hospital systems have cost advantages, greater bargaining power with 
insurers, increased name recognition, better access to capital, and protection from 
regional shocks.  While large hospital systems create more difficult negotiating 
environment for insurers, their presence gives insurers extended preferred provider 
network.  The data that I use track hospital system membership over time.  Through this I 
differentiate entry and exit of system members from non-system members. 
Governance structure is a very important characteristic of the Californian hospital 
market.  Dunne et al. (1988) and the entry and exit literature associated with their work 
do not address the role of governance structure.  This is understandable because within 
the manufacturing sector governance structure is relatively homogeneous.  In the hospital 
market, one of the most prominent firm characteristics is governance structure.  Profit 
status, government affiliation, and board behavior all play critical roles in forming a 
hospitals objectives and behaviors.  I explore the impact of governance structure on firm 
entry, market evolution, and exit.  In Chapter II, I demonstrate that not-for-profits have 
significantly different objectives than for-profit and government run hospitals.  Given that 
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governance structure is related to firm objectives, governance structure should also play 
an important role in firm entry and exit decisions.   
Researchers are beginning to model hospital entry and exit.  This research focuses 
on the effect entry and exit has on the competitiveness of hospital markets (e.g.  
Abraham, Gaynor, and Vogt 2007).  Very little is known about why and how hospitals 
enter and exit markets.  Empirical results regarding the effects of entry and exit are often 
contradictory.  My results provide insight into the issues underlying these contradictions.  
I demonstrate that entry and exit behavior varies over both system membership and 
governance structure.  Firms with different governance structures and different levels of 
geographic affiliation make significantly different market exit decisions.  An important 
consideration for hospital regulation is pricing behavior and community access to care. 
Without accounting for heterogeneous exit environments it is difficult to accurately 
predict the market effects of exit.  
This paper identifies how the patterns of entry and exit for service industries in 
general and the hospital industry specifically differ from manufacturing industries.  It 
serves two important roles.  First, it identifies important directions for future research in 
service industries.  Second, it provides a point of reference for both new research and 
critical analysis of existing studies on service industries. 
In section 2 of this chapter, I provide background information on entry, exit, and 
the hospital market.  Section 3 describes the construction of the data and summarizes 
trend in the key variables.  The distribution of entry and exit patterns across governance 
structure, and the correlations in these patterns are examined in section 4.  Section 5 
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focuses on post entry performance of hospitals by examining entrant market shares, sizes, 
growth rates, and failure over time.  Section 6 summarizes the main findings and provides 
context for these findings within the existing manufacture based entry and exit literature. 
 
Background  
Prior to Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988), a significant body of work 
existed on entry and exit.  This work focused on the market effects of entry and exit and 
left a surprising gap of knowledge surrounding the actual entry and exit decisions.  
Dunne et al. characterize the entry and exit of firms across a broad range of 
manufacturing sectors.  They observe entry, exit, and firm characteristics in five year 
intervals between 1963 and 1982.  The data reveal a number of important patterns: 
1. Entry rates and entrant market share vary across two digit manufacturing 
sectors and across markets within each sector; 
2. The market share of entering firms is disproportionately smaller than 
incumbents;  
3. Market entry and exit rates are highly correlated across industries.  
Further, market entry rates and entrant market share are correlated across 
time.  This suggests that industry specific factors contribute to entry and 
exit behavior; and 
4. New firms entering markets tend are smaller than old firms entering with 
new plants but larger than old firms entering by diversifying existing 
plants. 
 
Many of my findings can be related to Dunne et al: 
1. Average entry and exit rates in the hospital industry vary by governance 
structure and system membership.  Depending on the entry definition, 
hospital entry and exit rates are smaller than every manufacturing sector 
that Dunne et al. report and for most industries smaller by an order of 
magnitude; 
2. Entering firms are smaller than incumbents.  However the average 
disparity between the size of old and new firms is less pronounced for 
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hospitals than it is for every manufacturing sector that Dunne et al. report.  
New hospital facilities however are significantly smaller than incumbent 
facilities; 
3. Because my study focuses on a single industry, I cannot provide 
correlations across industry.  However, there is significant correlation 
between entry and exit across hospital ownership type.  This correlation is 
much stronger than that found across manufacturing industries; and 
4. The distribution of entry between new and old hospital firms is similar to 
manufacturing.  I find that the preexistence of both hospital facility and 
firm is a significant factor in entry and exit patterns, however the nature of 
the data lead me to define new plants differently than Dunne et al. In their 
study, the differentiating characteristic between new and old plants is 
ownership; I identify old plants as having previously functioned as a 
hospital. 
 
The size distribution of firms tends to be skewed towards small firms, with many 
firms apparently operating below the minimum efficient scale for their industry.  Dunne 
et al. (1988) and Audretsch and Mahmood (1993) demonstrate that firms tend to enter 
small and only firms that grow survive.  Older firms are competitive based on economies 
of scale while younger firms are competitive based on innovation (Autdretsch and 
Mahmood 1993).  Liu (1993) models the relationship between firm efficiency, entry, and 
exit.  The findings suggest that firm efficiency is heterogeneous within industries and that 
competition tends to push less efficient firms out of the market.   
This track of entry literature has led to the formulation of a stylized result that 
firm size and age are correlated with entrant survival (Geroski 1995.)  Entry size is 
consistently found to be positively related to firm survival.  This result is inconsistent 
with Gibrat's Law on the independence of growth and firm size.  My tabulations of entry 
and exit statistics support this empirical observation.   
The literature on firm entry evolves out of Joe Bain's (1956) work in “Barriers to 
New Competition.”  A survey of the literature reveals entry as a key mechanism for 
 39  
maintaining equilibrium prices and profitability (Audretsch and Mata 1995).  A near 
universal result in this literature is that entry leads to greater levels of competition, which 
in turn drives down prices.  However, a number of researchers have suggested that this 
result does not necessarily extend to the hospital industry. 
Rapidly growing health care cost and a wave of hospital closures in the 1970s and 
1980s has lead researchers to closely examine the structure and performance of hospitals.  
A major hypothesis that evolved out of this research was that hospital competition may 
lead to inefficiency through excess investment (Robinson and Luft 1985, Kopit and 
McCann 1988, McLaughlin 1988, McManis 1990).3  This phenomenon arises from a 
regime of independent physician and the externalization of health care costs as a result of 
insurance (Dranove and Statterthwaite 1999).   
Under the traditional medical system, physicians operate as independent financial 
entities.  To take advantage of economies of scale in operating facilities they share 
hospital services.  When multiple hospitals exist within a market physicians tend to 
associate with a single hospital.  Patients generally bear only a portion of the financial 
costs involved in the physician’s hospital choice.  This leads physicians to choose 
hospitals based on quality rather than price.  Thus, hospital competition becomes a case 
                                                            
3 This idea, often referred to as the medical arms race (MAR), is debated in an extended range of literature.  
The extent of the arms race may be sensetive to market definition (Dranove Shanley Simon 1992).  
Dranove, Shanley, and White (1993) find that the rise in managed care and Medicare’s switch to DRG 
repayment systems shifted hospital's competitive focus from quality to price.  Conner,  Feldman,  and 
Dowd  (1997) conferm Dranove and associates' hypothesis that managed care increases price competition.  
Kessler and McClellan (2000) find competition has an ambiguous effect on welfare in the 1980s but 
significantly improved social welfare in the 1990s.  However, Devers, Brewster, and Casalino (2003) 
document a new MAR beginning in 2001.  They suggest that consolidation in the hospital market is the 
driving force behind this shift.  Dranove and Statterthwaite (2000) provide a brief summary of the MAR 
literature up to 1998. 
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of quality competition addressed by Spence (1975).  More specifically, it is a form of 
quality competition whereby firms drive down profit through over-investment of capital. 
Entry of hospitals then imposes two contrary forces on hospital prices, with price 
competition acting in opposite of quality competition.  This result has motivated a closer 
examination of hospital entry, exit, and competition.  Under these circumstances there is 
no clear relationship between entry and welfare.  The hospital literature on entry has 
centered on resolving the welfare implications of hospital entry and exit.  However, a 
secondary, and unexamined implication, is that the entry and exit behavior of hospitals 
likely differs from standard patterns.  This behavior includes entry decisions regarding 
capacity, horizontal diversification, and firm governance. 
 The current literature on entry and exit in the hospital market focuses on using 
entry and exit to identify competitiveness and on identifying the welfare effects of entry 
and exit.  Abraham, Gaynor and Vogt (2007) utilize Breshnahan and Reiss' (1991) 
threshold population model to identify how quickly competition affects market power.  
They find that the benefits of competition converge rapidly, with majority coming from 
the second and third entry.  A drawback to the threshold population approach is that it 
cannot identify the competitiveness of the converged market. 
 Some argue that hospital entry actually leads to a type of quality competition 
referred to as the “medical arms race.”  Dranove, Shanely and White (1993) review the 
literature on the medical arms race and provide a comprehensive exposition on quality 
competition.  They confirm its importance, however they also note that the rise of 
managed care has led to a payer driven competition that helps to limit this trend.  They 
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suggest that the switch from patient to payer driven competition has little relationship 
between hospital entry and exit. 
 A number of researchers have identified that hospital exit patterns change over 
time.  A study on hospital exit conducted by Ciliberto and Lindrooth (2007) is 
particularly relevant to the survival literature reviewed above.  They find that firm 
efficiency is not a factor in hospital survival during the early 1990s; however it is, during 
the late 1990's.  The analysis in this chapter is less sensitive to structural change in 
markets because it does not impose a specific model onto the data. 
While there is a small body of research existing on hospital entry and exit, the 
hospital industry has not benefited from the type of empirical tabulations that form the 
foundations of Geroski's stylized results. 
Data 
For this analysis, I construct a 33 year panel from Californian hospitals using 
California's Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) Annual 
Hospital Financial Data.  The panel consists of all inpatient hospitals operating in 
California between 1976 and 2008.  Due to its completeness, these data appear in the 
recent hospital literature.  Yet, no research has taken advantage of the entire length of 
these data.  Indeed, most of the studies span periods fewer than 10 years.   
The data used in this study are not representative of the United States.  There is 
significant variation in hospital markets between states with regard to both governance 
composition and as such caution should be taken when applying these findings to other 
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regions.  However, because these data are used in many recent studies, the results will be 
comparable to the majority of existing hospital market literature. 
In this analysis, I include hospitals of all care types.  Table 8 provides a cross 
tabulation of hospitals by governance structure and type of care. There is some variation 
in type of care between governance structures.  In particular, for-profit hospitals are over-
represented in short term psychiatric hospitals and government hospitals have a larger 
portion of long term care hospitals.  This variation in type of care drives some of the 
observed differences between governance structures.   
Table 0.13.1 
Table 8: Type of Hospital by Governance 
Not-For-
Profit For-Profit 
Governmen
t 
Long-Term 
Children  1 0% 16 0% 3 0% 
Long-Term General 130 1% 205 3% 138 4% 
Long-Term 
Psychiatric 17 0% 39 1% 73 2% 
Long-Term 
Specialty  97 1% 32 1% 91 3% 
Short-Term 
Children  288 3% 3 0% 1 0% 
Short-Term General 7,435 86% 4,173 70% 2,772 80% 
Short-Term 
Psychiatric 376 4% 1,161 19% 370 11% 
Short-Term 
Specialty  337 4% 359 6% 15 0% 
Total 8,681   5,988   3,463   
 
I study entry and exit patterns over a 33 year period.  This period covers 
numerous paradigm shifts in the hospital industry.  These changes include new Medicare 
and Medicaid reimbursement policies, new modes of insurance, vastly different medical 
technology and an evolving epidemiology.  The impacts of these changes are difficult to 
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disentangle because many of these changes occur simultaneously and extent over 
multiple periods.  My methodology allows analysis of entry and exit without imposing an 
artificial structure around this dynamic environment. 
 
Data Construction 
 The data consist of all Annual Hospital Disclosure Reports submitted to the State 
of California between 1977 and 2009.  The first year of data, 1976, is unavailable due to 
tape storage deterioration.  These data are collected annually by the State of California’s 
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD).  In addition I use 
Bureau of Labor Statistics data on the consumer price index to deflate monetary 
variables. 
 The State of California mandates that all hospitals in California which provide 
inpatient care4 submit a yearly detailed report on their operations.  Every year OSHPD 
compiles individual annual reports into a single data set available as a flat file.  Included 
in the report is information on ownership, governance structure, services, capacity, 
utilization, and cash flows.  The annual report has been modified several times since the 
policy was initiated in 1975; however many of the variables of interest are included for 
the entire rage of report years.  In addition to the variables that have not changed over the 
report years, temporally consistent variables can be constructed from the data fields that 
experience some yearly variation.   
                                                            
4  Inpatient care is considered care provided to patients that require at least one overnight stay in hospitals. 
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Reports are submitted yearly for each owner of each facility.  Thus, the unit of 
observation is an owner-facility-year.  Each report covers the accounting year containing 
the first day of the year for which the report is submitted.  Nearly 70% of observations 
start in either January or July.5  Due to the staggering of start months, some of the yearly 
data sets provided by OSHPD include data from years preceding and following the report 
year.  Generating market shares and many other variables used in this analysis without 
compensating for staggered starting months would blend yearly trends and introduce 
significant error into the results.   
To correct for staggered starting months, new variables were created by 
combining reports when reporting periods spanned more than one year.  Only variables 
that are directly influenced by the specific report period, such as revenue and discharges, 
are modified.  Variables that are expected to change only once, variables that are not time 
dependent, categorical variables and non-numeric variables are not modified.  The 
reported amount for each modified variable was split three new variables by weighting 
the reported values with the percentage of the report that fell into that preceding, present, 
or following calendar year.  All weighted observations with the same calendar year were 
then summed into a single observation.  Thus the variable V  for owner o , facility f  and 
year t , oftV , became 1 / ( )*oft oftV a a b c V   , 2 / ( )*oft oftV b a b c V   , and 
3 / ( )*oft oftV b a b c V   , where ܽ is the number of reported days falling in the year 
preceding the report year, b is the number of reported days falling in the reported 
calendar year, and ܿ is the number of reported days falling in the following calendar year.  
                                                            
5  When excluding hospitals not reporting a full year January and July each gain one percent more mass; the 
rest of the distribution does not change significantly.   
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I then replace 1 ( 1) ( 1)oft of t oft of tV V V V    .  These new variables, along with variables that 
were not modified, comprise the annualized data. 
The number of days spanned by the report is identified through the reporting 
period start date and the reporting period stop date.  Small masses are focused at 30 day 
intervals with a small peak at a half year and a large peak at a full year.  Many of the 
reports with periods less than one year are due to firm entry and exit.  Excluding entry 
and exit shifts a significant mass of days to both full and half years.  Annualizing the data 
also shifts more mass to 365 days.  In the raw data 91% of observations report a full year 
while excluding entrants and exiters from the annualized data results in 98% of 
observations reporting full years.  Because some partial year reports remain in the data 
accumulating variables such as yearly revenue are converted into average daily revenue. 
The data are constructed as a 33 year balanced panel.  I conduct my analysis at 
three different levels: facility, firm, and facility-firm.  With facility and year as the unit of 
observation approximately 30 observations per year are not uniquely identified.  This is 
due to primarily to ownership changes that occur during the reporting period.  The 
remaining non-unique observations are duplicates due to partial year reports.  
Annualizing the data resolves duplication issues in two ways.  At the facility level of 
analysis, ownership is not relevant.  Variables which accumulate over time, such as 
yearly sales, are summed within each year and across ownership.  Variables which do not 
accumulate over time, such as beds licensed are averaged across duplicate observations.  
The annualizing the data at the facility level does pose one limitation.  Facilities that 
switch governance between years rather than at the year’s end actually operate under two 
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different governance structures within the same observation.  Excluding these 
observations does not significantly affect my findings. 
Facility is defined as a single hospital operating in a particular location.  The data 
contain 799 unique facilities.  These facilities are tracked over time through a state 
assigned facility ID number.  The method of assigning facility ID numbers was modified 
in the first few years of report collection.  This resulted in a mismatch of facilities over 
the period 1976-1982.  These facilities were matched by hand by comparing facility 
name, city, and address. 
Hospital ownership is an item reported by each hospital.  Ownership is reported 
by name rather than a single tracking number.  Entry error, abbreviations, punctuation 
and several other issues make matching ownership across report years and facilities 
problematic.  Hospital ownership is hand matched based on similarities in reported 
ownership.  Governance structure, year, and facility ID were used to aid matching 
decisions when reported ownership alone created ambiguous matches.  Firms reporting 
ambiguous owner names, such as “A nonprofit corporation” or not reporting an owner 
were matched to the temporally closest reported owner for the facility unless the closest 
reported owner was of a different governance structure than the observation with the 
missing owner.  Reported owners with identical spelling, or with spelling that varies only 
by spaces, abbreviations, punctuation and missing or extra characters were matched 
together.  Owners with slight word changes or subsets were compared with the owner 
names and governance type of the facility in previous and following years.  If previous or 
following owners had similar names and the same profit status the owners were matched.  
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After matching the data as described above, the number of unique owners observed in the 
data is reduced from 3,361 to 977.  The number of unique owner-facilities is 2,054.   
The described method of matching may result in two types of errors.  It may fail 
to match owners across facilities and time or it may incorrectly match owners across 
facilities and time.  I conducted several checks to confirm matching accuracy.  First, I 
examined owners that had gaps in the years that they owned a particular facility.  Second, 
I searched for owners who had gaps in owning any facility.  Finally, I searched for 
owners that switched governance type.  Each case of possible error was addressed on an 
individual basis. 
All Californian inpatient hospitals are required to submit an annual report if they 
operate for any length of time in a given report year.  For this reason, if a report is not 
filed for a particular facility in a particular year, it is assumed to have not participated in 
the market that particular year.  Similarly, if an owner did not file a report for a particular 
facility in a particular year the owner is assumed not to have operated that facility that 
year. 
This study considers entry and exit at three different levels: facilities, firms, and 
firm in a particular hospital market.  I construct three binary entry variables and three 
binary exit variables.  Facility entry in year t  takes a value of 1 if the facility operates in 
year ݐ and does not operate in year 1t  .  Facility exit in year t  takes a value of 1 if the 
facility operates in year t  and does not operate in year 1t  .  Owner-Facility entry in 
year ݐ takes a value of 1 if the owner o operates hospital h  in year t  and owner o  does 
not operate h  in year 1t  .  Owner-Facility exit in year t  takes a value of 1 if owner o  
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operates hospital h  in year t  and owner o  does not operate hospital h  in year 1t  .  
Owner entry in year t  takes a value of 1 if owner o operates any facility in year t  and 
does not operate any facilities in year 1t  .  Owner exit in year t  takes a value of 1 if the 
owner operates any facilities in year t  and does not operate in year 1t  . 
Table 9 summarizes the entry and exit of firms over the observed period.  
Observations designated as problem firms have multiple entries, multiple exits, or exits 
preceding entries.  These patterns are due to missing reports, facility or owner matching 
errors, or temporary hospital closures.  The majority of the analysis excludes firms with 
erratic entry behavior. 
Table 0.23.2 
Table 9: Entry and Exit in California 
 
Number of market 
entities 
Always in 
market 83 
Only exit 435 
Only enter 277 
Enter then 
exit 1,025 
Erratic entry 232 
 
Summary of Data 
 Over the extended period, there is significant structural change.  Before analyzing 
entry and exit behavior, I summarize the basic trends in the data.  This summary reveals a 
number of important characteristics regarding the California hospital market.  There has 
been a steady decline in the number of hospitals in California since 1977 (Figure 2.).  
This coincides with the first national push to fight hospital cost inflation lead by President 
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Carter.  The decrease is driven entirely by independent hospitals.  The number of 
independent hospitals in California dropped in half from 381 in 1977 to 193 in 2008.1 
Figure 2. Hospitals in Market 
 
 The decrease in hospitals is not constant across governance structure or system 
membership (Figure 3).  In fact, in the early 1990s, the number of not-for-profit hospitals 
in the market increased.  The number of not-for-profit hospitals does not begin declining 
until the late 1990s.  This is consistent with the idea that not-for-profit firms are less 
sensitive to profit, hence slower to exit markets than for-profit firms. 
 Coinciding with this decline in the number of hospitals has been a growth in 
California's population.  The population of California has steadily increased from 22 
million in 1976 to 38 million in 2008.  The decrease in the number of hospitals coupled 
with the increase in population suggests that hospitals experience greater volume than in 
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the past.  Usage statistics, which I present later in this section, provide strong evidence 
for this finding.  However, per capita hospital visits does decrease.  One possible 
explanation for this decrease is that many previously invasive procedures can now be 
conducted without overnight observation.  This has given rise to numerous ambulatory 
surgery centers. 
 
Figure 3. Hospitals in Market by Governance and System Membership 
 
 The number of hospital firms in California has decreased more rapidly than the 
number of hospitals.  The number of hospital facilities has decreased 28% over the study 
period and hospital ownership has decreased 40%.  This represents a substantial 
consolidation of hospitals.  Figure 4 depicts the decrease in the number of firms over 
time.  Firms operating single facilities experience the greatest decline.  Multi-hospital 
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firms increase until the early 1990s, than begin to gradually decline.  Single facility firms 
appear significantly disadvantaged in the hospital environment of the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s.   
Figure 4. Owners in Market by System Membership 
 
 Examining the trend in total hospitals by both governance and system 
membership underscores the importance of both of these factors in the hospital market.  
System hospitals of all three governance structures experience an increase in numbers at 
some point during the time period.  However, not-for-profit hospital systems are the only 
group of hospitals that experience an increased number of facilities over the entire study 
period.  Single member hospitals of all governance structures experience decline over the 
study period.   
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 Further, declines in single member hospitals are matched by increases for system 
hospitals of the same governance during the same time period.  Single not-for-profit 
hospitals decline over the entire study period while system not-for-profit hospitals 
increase over the entire period.  Single for-profit hospitals experience a sharp decline 
over the first ten years of the study period while system for-profit hospitals experience a 
sharp increase over the first ten years of the study period.  With government hospitals 
there appears to be a small lag before system hospitals increase. 
 This pattern could have several explanations.  System membership could be the 
first response to firms experiencing financial difficulty.  Increased HMO membership, 
insurer hospital negotiation, and governmental pressure on hospital cost containment in 
the late 1970s, and 1980s created significant pressure on hospitals.  System membership 
may increase bargaining power of hospitals and reduce operating costs through 
economies of scale and scope.  However, the benefits of system membership may not 
have been enough to compensate for the more difficult operating environment.  For-profit 
firms are believed to be more sensitive to losses than not-for-profit firms.  Following a 
switch to system membership many for-profit firms exit the market. 
 An alternate hypothesis is that the more profitable firms switch to system 
membership.  This hypothesis makes more sense when considering for-profit hospitals 
than not-for-profit or government run hospitals.  Profitable hospitals may be attractive 
acquisition targets for growing firms.  For-profit systems may have found the early 1980s 
to be a period of optimism, with firms expanding through acquisition, only to be faced 
with increased price competition in the late 1980s and 1990s, leading to high exit rates of 
for-profit hospital systems.  A third possibility is that single member hospitals facilities 
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actually close in low demand markets and system facilities open in high demand markets.  
A review of trends in the financial and operating characteristics of California hospital 
markets may help inform this issue. 
 Figure 5 depicts real total yearly operating revenue summed within governance 
types.  Real operating revenue has consistently increased for all governance types; 
however, not-for-profit hospitals experience a significantly greater increase in revenue.  
In the late 1990s, hospital cost inflation was successfully halted.  This is the only 
sustained period of stable inflation adjusted hospital revenue.  The stability of hospital 
costs during this time period is largely attributed to increased price competition driven by 
the rise of managed health care organizations.   
Figure 5. Real Daily Operating Revenue, Total by Governance 
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 The outstanding growth rate in operating revenue for not-for-profits is due in part 
to an increase in the relative number of not-for-profit hospitals.  When considering mean 
operating revenue, government hospitals match not-for-profit hospitals growth until the 
late 1990s.  Between 2000 and 2008, non-profit revenue growth far outstrips for-profit 
and government hospitals.  This period is associated with a resumption of hospital cost 
inflation claimed to be due to an increase in hospital concentration.  However, the 
number of owners in the market stays constant during this period, and while the number 
of hospitals in the market does decrease, it decreases at a lower rate than in the previous 
decade. 
 The increase in real revenue is not due to an increase in hospital services.  The 
total number of licensed beds (Figure 6) and hospital patient days6 (Figure 7) in 
California decreases by approximately 20% over the study period.  Hospital discharges 
(Figure 8) increases slightly over the study period, with not-for-profit discharges 
increasing, for-profit discharges constant and government discharges decreasing.  During 
this period the days per discharge decrease slightly across governance structure (see 
Figure 9) 
 There are two potential explanations for these observations.  Surgical procedures 
have become much less invasive over time.  This limits recovery time and in some cases 
allows same day discharge.  Beginning in the early 1990s ambulatory surgery centers, 
standalone facilities without overnight capacity, began increasing in number.  This likely 
accounts for the fact that discharges remain constant in the face of rising population.  
                                                            
6 A patient day is defined as an individual patient spending any amount of time in a hospital in a particular 
24 hour period. 
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Figure 6. Capacity, Total by Governancegur 
 
Figure 7. Daily Patient Days, Total by Governance 
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Figure 8. Daily Discharges, Total by Governance 
 
Figure 9. Patient Days per Discharge, Mean by Governance 
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The average capacity of individual hospitals (Figure 10) increases slightly for 
both not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals.  Government hospitals experience a 
significant decline in capacity in the late 1970s.  For-profit hospitals average half the size 
of not-for-profits and one third the size of government hospitals.  This suggests that the 
role of capacity in the operation, entry and post-entry performance of hospitals depends 
on hospital governance structure.  I explore this idea further in sections 4, 5 and 6.  It is 
interesting to note that government hospitals on average have higher capacity and patient 
days but fewer discharges.  This is likely because government hospitals tend to play a 
greater role in long-term care.   
Figure 10. Hospital Capacity, Median by Governance 
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accounting for the fact that firms with different governance structures tend to provide a 
different mix of services to a different mix of patients.  Most researchers simply exclude 
hospitals that are not self-identified as short term general hospitals.  By doing this, much 
of the richness in the interactions and operations of different governance structures is lost.  
A brief examination of revenue per patient day can demonstrate this. 
 Median real revenue per patient day (Figure 11) increases by a factor of 10 from 
$481 in 1976 to $2970 in 2008.  Real revenue per patient discharge also increases by a 
factor of 10 from $2,970 in 1976 to $28,929 in 2008.  These are indeed substantial 
increases; both revenue per day and revenue per discharge grow at similar rates.  Figure 
11 contains graphs of real revenue per patient day by system membership and governance 
structure.  Revenue per discharge in 2008 is only $22,748 for not-for-profit system 
hospitals and $313,583 for government system hospitals.  The extraordinary increase in 
government revenue per discharge is due a few long term care hospitals experiencing 
longer days per discharge.  Withstanding government system hospitals, I now have 
results that are consistent with the fact that hospital stays are shortening.  Clearly 
government system hospitals function in a different environment and serve a distinctly 
different market segment than other types of hospitals.   
 Coupling this observation with the fact that government system hospitals 
decreased by 75% from 1995 to 2007 suggests that long term care in California has 
experienced dramatic change in the last decade.  Neither the decline in government 
hospitals nor the effects of this decline on the market has been addressed by the current 
literature.  Government owned facilities are often considered “safety net” hospitals for 
low income and uninsured populations. 
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Figure 11. Real Hospital Revenue, Median by System Membership 
 The hospital market concentration literature is primarily concerned with the effect 
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scale.  These data demonstrate that the hospital market has evolved to and environment 
that favors these economies. 
 
Figure 12. Share of Revenue Relative to System Membership 
 
Figure 13. Hospitals in Market by System Membership 
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In a study of the determinants of mergers, Tremblay and Tremblay (1988) point to 
three reasons for mergers.  First, mergers could lead to increased market power and 
greater profit margins.  This motivation is particularly pertinent for mergers between 
geographically close hospitals.  However, even mergers occurring across markets could 
lead to a greater exercise of market power improved bargaining positions with insurers.  
The second motivation for merging is multiplant economies of scale.  Their third 
explanation is that merging is an efficient method of transferring assets from failing 
operations to successful operations.  Within the hospital industry a fourth motivation 
should be considered.  If firms include the welfare of consumers in their objective 
function firms may merge to maintain access to care in underserved regions.   
The acquisition behavior of hospital systems could provide a clue to hospital 
objectives.  One of the current conflicts in the hospital merger literature is whether 
mergers result in monopoly pricing.  The standard approach to this issue is to identify 
post merger changes in pricing.  However, if mergers occur as part of an attempt to save a 
failing hospital increased prices are to be expected.   
Figure 14 depicts median real net operating income per day for different 
governance structures.  The preceding discussion suggests that, while the hospital market 
is an established industry, it has and is currently undergoing significant change.  An 
important factor in this change relates to the rise of the not-for-profit system hospitals.  In 
the sections that follow, I examine the entry and post entry behavior of hospitals.  I 
identify how the entry behavior of not-for-profit hospitals differs from that of both for-
profit and government hospitals.   
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Figure 14. Daily Net Operating Income, Median by Governance 
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( 1)egsNX t   = number of entities e  in (facilities, facility/owners, owners) with 
governance structure g  in (not-for-profit, for-profit, government) and system 
membership status s  in (member of hospital system, single hospital firm) that 
exit between the year 1t   and t . 
 
( )egsQE t  = total output of entities e  in (facilities, facility/owners, owners) with 
governance structure g  in (not-for-profit, for-profit, government) and system 
membership status s  in (member of hospital system, single hospital firm) that 
enter between the year 1t   and t . 
 
( )egsQT t  = total output of entities e  in (facilities, facility/owners, owners) with 
governance structure g  in (not-for-profit, for-profit, government) and system 
membership status s  in (member of hospital system, single hospital firm) that 
exist in year t . 
 
( 1)egsQX t   = total output of entities e  in (facilities, facility/owners, owners) 
with governance structure g  in (not-for-profit, for-profit, government) and 
system membership status s  in (member of hospital system, single hospital firm) 
that exit between the year 1t   and t . 
 
Entry and exit rates are defined using the above variables: 
ܧܴ௘௚௦ሺݐሻ ൌ ܰܧ௘௚௦ሺݐሻ/ܶ ௘ܰ௚௦ሺݐ െ 1ሻ 
ܴܺ௘௚௦ሺݐሻ ൌ ܰܺ௘௚௦ሺݐ െ 1ሻ/ܰ ௘ܶ௚௦ሺݐ െ 1ሻ 
 These rates assume that entrant and exiter pools are segregated by both governance 
structure and system membership.  This assumption has strong support for all cases 
except distinguishing between single not-for-profit and for-profit entrants.  The support 
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for segregating exiters is self-evident as firms can only exit as a particular governance 
structure or system member is they existed as such in the prior year.  The vast majority of 
system entry for both facilities and facility/owners occurs by firms existing in prior years.  
Thus, preexistence restricts the entry pool to particular governance/system memberships.  
Single hospital entry pools are not observed.  Because the pool of entrants is not observed 
entry rate is calculated using the number of firms in the market during the preceding year 
as the denominator.  Government entry is not a form of entry that is available to general 
entrepreneurs.  However, it is possible that not-for-profit and for-profit entrants come 
from a single pool.  A more appropriate measure of entry rate for these two cases (non-
system entry by not-for-profits and for-profits) could be  
ܧܴ௘௚௦ሺݐሻ ൌ ܰܧ௘௚௦ሺݐሻ/∑ ܶ ௘ܰ௚௦ሺݐ െ 1ሻ௚אሺ௡௣,௙௣ሻ .  These rates are defined in a manner 
consistent with entry rates of Dunne et al. in order to allow a comparison of my results. 
 The impact of entry and exit on market structure depend on the relative size of 
entering and exiting firms.  To track this dependence, I define entrant market share and 
entrant relative size.  Entrant and exit market share is computed as: 
ܧܵܪ௘௚௦ሺݐሻ ൌ ܳܧ௘௚௦ሺݐሻ/ܳ ௘ܶ௚௦ሺݐሻ 
ܺܵܪ௘௚௦ሺݐ െ 1ሻ ൌ ܳܺ௘௦ሺݐ െ 1ሻ/ܳ ௘ܶ௚௦ሺݐ െ 1ሻ 
Thus, the entrant's market share is measured as a portion of production in the period of 
entry while the exiter's market share is measured as a portion of production in the period 
prior to exit.  Relative size is calculated as follows: 
ܧܴܵ௘௚௦ሺݐሻ ൌ ܳܧ௘௚௦ሺݐሻ/ܰܧ௘௚௦ሺݐሻቀܳ ௘ܶ௚௦ሺݐሻ െ ܳܧ௘௚௦ሺݐሻቁ / ቀܰ ௘ܶ௚௦ሺݐሻ െ ܰܧ௘௚௦ሺݐሻቁ
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( 1) / ( 1)
( 1)
( ( 1) ( 1)) / ( ( ) ( 1))
egs egs
egs
egs egs egs egs
QX t NE t
XRS t
QT t QX t NT t NX t
         
Market share and relative size are thus calculated relative to firm type.  In the appendix, I 
provide a summary of these variables calculated with all firms as the base.  The 
interpretations of the variables calculated in this manner changes considerably. 
Entry and Exit Statistics 
 The first step in identifying patterns of entry and exit is to measure the levels of 
the entry variables over time.  Tables 10 through 12 provide yearly means for ER , XR , 
ESH , XSH , ERS , and XRS  at three different levels of entry analysis: owner, facility, 
and owner-facility.  The yearly averages are constructed by calculating the variables as 
described above and averaging across the six permutations of governance structure and 
system membership.  I first present market tabulations and then introduce the importance 
of governance structure and system membership. 
 The entry and exit variables for hospital firms summarized in table 10 are similar 
to other industries.  Firm exit rate is consistently higher than entry rate.  Between 1978 
and 2000 only three years experienced positive net entry.  After 2000, the number of 
firms in the market remains relatively constant.  These entry rates are comparable to  
those calculated in Dunne et al.; however, they are below average rates across industries.  
Market share of entering and exiting firms is also significantly below average, ranging 
between .02 and .11 for entering firms and .01 to .09 for exiting firms.  Both entrants and 
exciters are relatively smaller than survivors.  This is consistent with the pattern that 
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firms enter small and must grow to survive, however further evidence should be required 
to substantiate this claim.  Section 5 investigates this issue further. 
Entry and exit variables for hospital facilities are summarize in table 11.  Facility 
entry and exit rates are much lower than firm entry and exit rates.  The pattern in relative 
size of entry and exit rates of hospitals seems to be the inverse of firms.  After the early 
1990s, the gap between hospital exit and entry rate becomes larger rather than smaller.  In 
addition, the early 1980s has large net entry of firms but relatively small net entry of 
hospitals.  Firm entry follows significantly different patterns than facility and facility/firm 
entry. 
 The market share of entering and exiting hospitals is very small.  In fact, for every 
year in the study period, entry and exit market share is smaller than that of all but one 
industry, tobacco, examined by Dunne et al. (1988).7  Thus, on the state level, entry and 
exit play relatively small roles in the market.  It is important to note that, while at the 
state level, entry and exit do not represent large portions of production, on the local level 
exit could have a significant effect on access to care.   
 Relative size of entering and exiting hospitals is much smaller than surviving 
hospitals.  The average relative size of entrants is .29 and that of exiters is .28.  This is 
significantly smaller than firms.  Firms can enter the market by acquiring existing 
hospitals or constructing new hospitals.  A firm that enters by acquiring an existing 
hospital can take advantage of preexisting human capital and hospital organization.  
Similarly, firms that exit by selling are likely more profitable or efficient than firms that 
                                                            
7  Averaging over years results in exit and entrant shares (.01 and .01) for hospitals that are lower than 
tobacco firms (.03, .02). 
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exit by closing.  The entry and exit figures provided in table 11 represent both firms that 
exit by closing facilities and facilities that closed but whose owners continue to operate 
elsewhere either do the moving or due to system membership. 
 Table 12 summarizes entry and exit variables of facility-owners.  This version of 
the unit of observation provides the most instances of entry and exit in the data.  Average 
entry and exit rates of facility-owners are higher than both facilities and owners.  This is 
expected because if owner -facility exit occurs without hospital exit, an owner-facility 
entrance must have also occurred.  Every year an average of 6.4% of hospitals change 
owners. 
 The relative size of facility-owner entrants and exiters is higher than both owner 
and facility entrants and exiters.  Facility-owner entry is the only type of entry that 
involves both experienced owners and preexisting hospitals.  This type of entry involves 
relatively little risk as entrants have information about their own capabilities, the 
characteristics of the market and a functioning operation. 
 Two possible explanations stand out for why relative size increases from hospitals 
to owners and from owners to owner entrants.  The first is that as risk of failure reduces 
entrants are more willing to invest near the efficient scale.  The second is that I are 
examining two significantly different types of entry, greenfield entry, when a new facility 
is opened, and brownfield entry, when a preexisting facility changes ownership.   
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Table 0.33.3 
Table 10: Entry and Exit Variables for Firms 
Year ER XR ESH XSH ERS XRS
1977 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.01 0.75 0.11 
1978 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.49 0.72 
1979 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.32 0.67 
1980 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.73 0.34 
1981 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.73 0.74 
1982 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.43 0.38 
1983 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.64 0.54 
1984 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.58 0.62 
1985 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.67 0.30 
1986 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.23 0.65 
1987 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.58 0.44 
1988 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.79 0.32 
1989 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.41 0.38 
1990 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.50 0.67 
1991 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.43 0.54 
1992 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.49 0.52 
1993 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.36 0.82 
1994 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.06 1.13 0.59 
1995 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.40 0.49 
1996 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.23 0.81 
1997 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.29 0.42 
1998 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.33 0.46 
1999 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.35 0.30 
2000 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.62 0.19 
2001 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.39 
2002 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.46 0.28 
2003 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.48 0.18 
2004 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.44 0.40 
2005 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.38 0.42 
2006 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.25 0.50 
2007 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 1.05 0.51 
2008 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.24 0.00 
Mean 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.50 0.46 
ER=Entry Rate  
XR=Exit Rate  
ESH=Entry Relative Share 
ESH=Exit Relative Share 
ERS=Entry Relative Size 
XRS=Exit Relative Size 
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Table 0.4 
Table 11: Entry and Exit Variables for Facilities 
Year ER XR ESH XSH ERS XRS 
1977 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.10 
1978 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.53 0.16 
1979 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.70 
1980 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 1.85 0.23 
1981 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.22 0.12 
1982 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.02 
1983 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.16 
1984 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.12 
1985 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.27 0.16 
1986 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.36 
1987 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.30 0.18 
1988 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.26 0.18 
1989 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.35 
1990 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.20 0.18 
1991 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.23 
1992 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.24 
1993 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.14 
1994 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.24 0.29 
1995 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.21 
1996 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.70 
1997 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.43 
1998 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.76 0.57 
1999 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.02 1.36 0.41 
2000 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.71 0.18 
2001 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.52 
2002 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.53 
2003 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.44 0.25 
2004 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.39 
2005 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.13 0.06 
2006 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.24 
2007 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.53 
2008 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 
Mean 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.29 
ER=Entry Rate  
XR=Exit Rate  
ESH=Entry Relative Share 
ESH=Exit Relative Share 
ERS=Entry Relative Size 
XRS=Exit Relative Size
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Table 0.5 
Table 12: Entry and Exit Variables for 
Firm/Facilities 
Year ER XR ESH XSH ERS XRS 
1977 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.80 0.42 
1978 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.50 0.64 
1979 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.57 1.11 
1980 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.07 1.14 0.65 
1981 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.89 0.70 
1982 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.58 0.96 
1983 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.57 0.58 
1984 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.76 0.70 
1985 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.71 0.40 
1986 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.31 0.73 
1987 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.79 0.67 
1988 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.71 0.60 
1989 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.60 0.56 
1990 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.70 0.75 
1991 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.55 0.81 
1992 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.59 0.59 
1993 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.17 0.55 1.08 
1994 0.14 0.08 0.17 0.07 0.91 0.72 
1995 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.11 0.99 0.68 
1996 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.52 1.10 
1997 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.52 0.74 
1998 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.07 1.10 0.70 
1999 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.07 1.12 0.63 
2000 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.96 0.34 
2001 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.29 0.52 
2002 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.51 0.59 
2003 0.03 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.61 0.50 
2004 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.58 0.65 
2005 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.84 0.57 
2006 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.50 0.93 
2007 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.06 1.20 0.86 
2008 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.71 0.69 
Mean 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.71 0.69 
ER=Entry Rate  
XR=Exit Rate  
ESH=Entry Relative Share 
ESH=Exit Relative Share 
ERS=Entry Relative Size 
XRS=Exit Relative Size
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Greenfield entry occurs when market has grown sufficiently to support entry by a new 
firm.  In the presence of barriers to entry a threshold growth level must occur before a 
new firm finds it profitable to enter.  In the presence of market power, entry occurs before 
the market size has grown sufficiently to support a new hospital at the minimum efficient 
scale. 
 Brownfield entry occurs when an entrant believes that they have a greater 
operating efficiency than the owner of a preexisting hospital.  Brownfield entry thus 
occurs sometime after greenfield entry and thus after the market has grown beyond the 
entry threshold.  It is likely that both explanations play a role in the observed increase in 
relative size. 
Entry Type 
 To characterize patterns of entry among greenfield and brownfield entrants, I 
calculate the entry and exit variables using entry type rather than the governance system 
membership distinction.  I divide facility-owner entries into four categories new firm new 
hospital (NF/NH), new firm old hospital (NF/OH), old firm new hospital (OF/NH), and 
old firm old hospital (OF/OH).  In addition to summing across different criteria, I use a 
pooled denominator when calculating rates.  The variables ܳܶሺݐሻ and ܰܶሺݐሻ represent 
the entire production and number of firms in Californian in time ݐ.  I use the same 
denominator for the different entry types for two reasons.  First, the pool of entrants for 
new firms cannot be observed.  Second, a single denominator will allow comparison of 
entry and exit variables across entry type. 
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 Table 13 summarizes the mean entry and exit rates for across entry type.  Note 
that because of the use of a pooled base, the interpretation of these variables differs from 
those presented earlier.  Magnitudes of ER , XR , ESH , and XSH  are smaller simply 
because the denominator includes the entire market.  Furthermore, entry rates and entry 
shares are now higher on average than exit rates and exit shares.   
 The entry and exit rates for old hospitals are five to ten times that of new 
hospitals; however, old firms and new firms enter at similar rates.  The mean entrant 
relative size for preexisting firms opening new facilities is greater than new firms 
opening new hospitals.  Similarly mean entrant relative size for old firms purchasing old 
hospitals is larger than new firms purchasing old hospitals.  This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that diversifying firms have lower risk than new firms.  New and old firms 
entering with new hospitals are smaller than new and old firms entering with old 
hospitals. 
Table 0.6 
Table 13: Mean Entry and Exit Variables by 
Entry Type 
  NF/NH NF/OH DF/NH DF/OH 
ER 0.005 0.035 0.007 0.026 
 (.004) (.015) (.006) (.014) 
XR 0.003 0.028 0.005 0.021 
 (.003) (.013) (.006) (.012) 
ESH 0.001 0.02 0.004 0.019 
 (.002) (.012) (.008) (.014) 
XSH 0.001 0.015 0.002 0.012 
 (.001) (.009) (.005) (.01) 
ERS 0.158 0.562 0.463 0.695 
 (.168) (.245) (.87) (.398) 
XRS 0.191 0.48 0.718 0.587 
  (.211) (.215) (2.959) (.623) 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
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 Both of these findings are consistent with my explanation of the increasing 
relative sizes reported in section 3.4.1.  These findings suggest that there may be 
differences across governance structures in the decision of how to enter markets and that 
preexisting firms enter systematically different markets than new firms. 
Governance Structure and System Membership 
 It is clear from section 3 that there are significant differences between hospitals of 
different governance structures and system memberships.  In this section, I conduct a 
more detailed investigation of how entry and exit patterns differ between not-for-profit, 
for-profit and government hospitals for both system and single hospitals.  I analyze the 
entry and exit variables using both pooled and unpooled denominators.  The pooled 
variables will allow comparison relative to the market.  From these variables, I draw 
conclusions regarding relative importance and size of the different hospital sectors.  
Hospital firms in different sectors appear to operate in fundamentally different ways.  The 
variables calculated with unpooled denominators allow me to draw conclusions regarding 
these sectors that are independent of the relative importance of the sectors to the market 
as a whole. 
 Single plant firms enter and exit at a higher rate than multiplant firms.  In fact, no 
government multiplant firm has entered the market since 1993.  For-profit firms have 
strikingly high entry and exit rates.  Between 2003 and 2008, forty for-profit single firms 
entered the market and the total number of for-profit single firms increased from 42 to 52 
and 27 for-profit single firms survived from 2003.  Between 2003 and 2008 the entry rate 
for for-profit firms was nearly 1, compared to an entry rate of .12 for single government 
and .16 for single not-for-profit firms in the same time period.  This five year time period 
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is calculated to provide comparison with Dunne et al. (1988), whose data is only 
available in 5 year increments.  Note, however, that the data used by Dunne et al. does 
not identification of firms that enter then exit within a 5 year period.  Ignoring entry and 
exit in the intervening years would lower my calculation of for-profit single firm entry 
rate from .95 to .19. 
 Table 14 summarizes mean yearly entry by governance structure and system 
membership.  This provides strong evidence that single hospital owners from all three 
governance structures have average entry rates higher than their multiplant counterparts.  
For-profits experience relatively greater entry than nonprofits and nonprofits than 
government firms.  For-profit hospitals change ownership more rapidly than other types 
of hospitals.  This is consistent with the idea that not-for-profit firms are less sensitive to 
profit than for-profit firms. 
Table 0.7 
Table 14: Means by Governance and System Membership 
 Entry Rate Entrant Market Share 
 Independent System Independent System 
Not-for-profit 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.01 
 (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) 
For Profit 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.04 
 (.05) (.09) (.06) (.07) 
Government 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 
  (.04) (.02) (.03) (.01) 
Standard deviation in parentheses 
 
Post Entry Performance  
The role of entry on market performance depends not simply the size and share of 
entrants.  I turn now to firm performance in the years following entry.  Previous entry 
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literature supports a stylized fact that firms tend to enter markets below the minimum 
efficient scale and surviving entrants grow faster than incumbents.  In the previous 
sections, I demonstrate that hospitals follow this pattern of relatively small entry size.  
These differences are persistent when limiting the data to short term general hospitals. To 
assess the post entry performance of firms I examine how the relative size of entrants 
changes over time, and how growth rates for surviving firms differ from exiting firms. 
 Table 15 reports the average relative size of entrants in the years following entry.  
Nearly all entry cohorts, 28 of 32, have relative size less than one.  This means that the 
average size of an entry cohort is smaller than the average size of incumbent firms at the 
year of entry.  The cohorts entering in 1979 and 1980 included several relatively large 
state hospitals. And consequently persist as outliers throughout the research period. There 
is no clear trend of increasing relative size.  Dunne et al. (1988) find that entry cohorts 
consistently increase in relative size over time.  This raises the question why is the 
hospital industry different?  The evolution of relative size over time is similar across all 
governance structures.  Results are also similar when basing entry on the facility level 
and the owner-facility level. 
 While entrants do not systematically grow in relative size, it is incorrect to assume 
that absolute growth is not a critical factor for entrants.  Surviving firms have a 
significantly higher growth rate than failing firms.  Table 16 presents the results of 
regressing growth rate of firms against a dummy variable marking exiting firms.8  Firms 
                                                            
8 The values of these means change slightly when examining only short-term general hospitals.  However, 
the signs, significance, and significance of differences across governance structures remains. 
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that exit have significantly smaller growth rates than firms that survive.  Similar results 
hold when comparing lagged growth rates.   
 These two findings paint a much different picture for the hospital market than the 
standard industry findings for post entry performance.  Audresch and Mahmood (1993) 
characterize markets as having many small firms entering beneath a minimum efficient 
scale and relying on rapid growth to achieve a competitive size, resulting in a skewed 
distribution of firm size.  The hospital market also has a skewed distribution of firm size.  
However, I find that entrants do not necessarily outgrow incumbents.  None-the-less, 
firms that fail to grow are more prone to exit. 
 Not-for-profit and government firms have similar growth rates; however, for-
profits have significantly larger growth rates than not-for-profit.  Not-for-profit and for-
profit firms that fail have significantly lower growth rates than firms that survive.  
Multiplant firms grow at a much faster rate than single plant firms.  Multiplant firms that 
exit have significantly lower growth rates than multiplant firms that survive.   
Conclusions 
 This paper has identified numerous striking patterns in Californian hospitals.  
These are of interest for two reasons.  First they provide a service industry counterpart to 
existing information on manufacturing industries.  Second, they identify important 
directions for future research on hospital markets.   
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Table 0.8 
   
Table 15: Relative Size of Entry Cohort  
Cohort 
entry year 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
1993-
2008 
Pre-existing 
Firm 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.90 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.88 0.88 0.85 
 
1977  0.40 1.74 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.56 0.56  
1978   0.24 0.34 0.33 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.30 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.39 0.36  
1979    8.47 4.47 4.56 4.72 5.22 5.73 6.02 6.00 5.90 6.19 0.63 1.68 2.53 3.18  
1980     2.52 2.43 2.54 2.69 2.78 2.82 2.86 2.74 2.77 3.22 1.00 1.23 1.56  
1981           0.05 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.06  
1982       0.25 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.32 0.30 0.26 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.16  
1983        0.15 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.25  
1984         0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.12  
1985                   0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.10  
1986           0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04  
1987            0.47 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.49  
1988             0.16 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.15  
1989              0.18 0.17 0.20 0.21  
1990                             0.23 0.25 0.25  
1991                0.14 0.17  
1992                 0.41  
 78  
Table 15: (extended) 
Cohort entry 
year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Pre-existing 
Firm 0.84 0.78 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.67 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.56 
1977 0.59 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.44 
1978 0.34 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.22 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 
1979 2.25 5.97 5.62 4.95 5.41 5.30 6.19 6.31 6.32 6.59 6.34 6.55 6.18 6.31 5.65 5.98 
1980 1.73 3.17 2.83 2.84 2.45 2.30 2.65 2.75 2.88 2.79 3.63 3.99 4.04 4.27 4.14 3.91 
1981 0.05                               
1982 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 
1983 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 
1984 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 
1985 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
1986 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.31 
1987 0.47 0.42 0.40 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.21 
1988 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
1989 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 
1990 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
1991 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.13 
1992 0.21 0.45 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.57 0.50 0.43 0.45 0.55 0.59 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.67 0.71 
1993 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.11 
1994 0.33 0.45 0.42 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 
1995     0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 
1996 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.28 
1997 0.10 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 
1998 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.62 0.62 0.58 0.61 0.58 0.48 0.46 0.45 
1999 2.67 2.63 2.48 2.41 2.33 2.30 2.27 2.19 2.11 2.06 
2000 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.53 
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Table 15: (continued) 
2001                 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.13 
2002 
2003 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.22 
2004 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 
2005                         0.04 0.09 0.11 0.11 
2006 0.45 0.28 0.20 
2007 0.02 0.02 
2008   0.19 
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Table 0.9 
Table 16: Mean Growth Rates by Governance and Survival 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Owner Facility Owner-Facility 
 Growth Growth Growth 
NPExit -0.0863* -0.3 -0.0530*** 
 (0.05) (1.26) (0.01) 
FPExit -0.166*** -0.2 -0.0951*** 
 (0.05) (1.03) (0.01) 
GOVExit -0.11 -0.47 -0.0780*** 
 (0.11) (1.64) (0.03) 
NP 0.0744*** 0.21 0.0442*** 
 (0.01) (0.14) (.000) 
FP 0.123*** 0.06 0.0596*** 
 (0.02) (0.18) (.000) 
GOV 0.0766*** 0.409* 0.0430*** 
 (0.02) (0.21) (0.01) 
    
Observations 7000 14695 11961 
R-squared 0.02 0 0.03 
NP=FP F 5.45 0.44 7.57 
NP=FP Prob>F 0.02 0.51 0.01 
NP-NPExit=FP-FPExit F 2.8 0.02 8.13 
NP-NPExit=FP-FPExit 
Prob>F 0.09 0.88 0 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 The examination of basic trends regarding the number, size, utilization and 
profitability of different types of hospitals provides significant insight into the evolution 
of the hospital market.  Over the last 30 years, there has been a constant decline in 
Californian hospitals and an increase in the concentration of hospital firms.  This period 
also experienced a switch from net losses to net gains.  However, these changes were not 
consistent across either governance structure or system membership.  Nonprofit hospitals 
and system affiliated hospitals tend to fair better over the study period, and nonprofit 
system hospitals in particular grew in both number and profitability over the entire 
period.  Because declines in one type of firm are matched with increases of other types of 
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firms the data suggest there is an underlying process relating exiting firms to entering 
firms.  Three potential hypotheses to explore are: 
 Hospitals switch governance or system membership to survive, 
 Firms seeking to expand target particular types of hospitals, or 
 Exit is occurring in different submarkets than entry. 
 
The most striking exit trend in California revolves around government system 
hospitals.  Government system hospitals decrease from a high of 56 in 1995 to a low of 
14 in 2007.  The data indicate that government system hospitals serve a distinct segment 
of the hospital market.  What is the reason for this 75% reduction in hospitals and what is 
the impact of this reduction on both the remaining hospitals and on Californian residents? 
 The hospital market mirrors some well-established patterns of manufacturing 
industries, but there are also a number of important differences.  Entry and exit in 
hospital markets by firms occur with similar frequency as other industries.  Facilities, on 
the other hand, have exceptionally low entry and exit rates.  Despite this I still observe a 
significant decline in the number of hospital facilities over the study period.  While 
nonprofit and system hospitals appear to perform better over the study period, for-profit 
and system hospitals actually enter and exit at a higher rate. 
Within other industries high turnover is thought to be related to technological 
innovation and the product lifecycle.  The study period is associated with significant 
technological innovation in the hospital industry.  If current literature on product lifecycle 
and technological innovation is accepted, it must be concluded that hospitals of different 
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governance structures are at different stages in the product lifecycle and that 
technological innovation is generated and disseminated in different ways for each 
permutation of governance and system membership. 
 Alternately, service industries and hospitals may experience technological 
innovation in a different manner than manufacturing industries.  This points to yet 
another direction that has seen little research by economists; technological innovation in 
service industries. 
 Dunne et al. (1988) distinguish between new plant and old plant diversification, 
but this distinction refers to the use of a previously owned plant or the use of a newly 
owned plant.  It does not identify whether entry occurs via construction or acquisition.  
Because of this they fail to differentiate between non-diversifying entrants who enter via 
new plants from non-diversifying entrants who enter through old plants.  Within the 
hospital industry this distinction is particularly important.  Market entry involving either 
pre-existing hospitals or pre-existing firms involves significantly greater entry size and 
market share.  Unlike Dunne et al. (1988) and Geroski (1995), who found that new firms 
enter at a greater rate than old firms, new hospital firms and old hospital firms enter and 
exit at similar rates.  However, new firms establishing new hospitals enter with extremely 
small relative size, while diversifying firms establishing new hospitals enter with 
relatively larger sizes. 
 The post entry performance of hospitals does not follow that of other industries.  
For most industries firms enter relatively small and over time surviving firms grow 
rapidly to approach the relative size of incumbents.  Surviving hospitals on the other hand 
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appear to grow at similar rates regardless of age.  Thus, I extend Audretsch et al.’s (2004) 
finding that Gibrat’s law holds for small scale services to the hospital industry, a 
relatively large scale service industry. 
 The patterns documented in this paper identify a broad spectrum of areas in which 
hospitals differ from other industries.  Each of these issues represents important 
directions for future research.  Further, these differences reveal that standard approaches 
to modeling entry and exit will not adequately identify hospital behavior. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ENTRY ATTRIBUTES, FIRM EXIT, AND SURVIVAL IN THE HOSPITAL 
INDUSTRY  
Entry, exit, and industry evolution comprise one of the most significant topics in 
the study of industrial organization.  Firm entry and exit are key factors in the efficiency 
of markets.  Previous work in this area, including the work presented earlier in this 
volume, has identified a number of common patterns in how firms enter and exit markets.  
However, the mechanisms underlying these patterns remain unclear.  Much of the recent 
entry literature models entry, exit and industry evolution as a story of technological 
innovation and competition amongst incumbent firms and potential entrants (Siegfried 
and Evans 1994).  The success of entrants is hypothesized to depend on individual firm 
characteristics (Jovanovic 1982, Dunne et al. 2005, Ciliberto and Lindrooth 2007, Cabral 
1995, Mata Portugal Guimaraes 1995. Farinas Ruano 2005, Darhoff Stahl Woywode 
1998, Audretsch Mahmood 1995, Chakravarty et al. 2006 Deily McKay Dorner 2000, 
Harrison Laincz 2008), market characteristics such as technological intensity or life cycle 
stage (Klepper 2002, Agarwal and Audrestch 2001, Agarwal and Gort 1996, Agarwal 
1998, Audrestch 1991, Audretsch Mahmood 1995, Klepper 1996, Klepper and Miller 
1995) and the post entry success of the firm increasing efficiency (Klepper 2002, 
Hopenhayn 1992, and Ericson and Pakes 1995).  While these models have been 
successful in explaining the relationship between entry characteristics and exit behavior 
of firms, they fail to explain why firms enter with heterogeneous size. 
 The research finds that entry capacity is positively related to firm survival.  
This finding is consistent across industries and governance structures.  The majority of 
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this research refers to Jovanovic’s (1982) model of uncertain costs and firm specific 
efficiency.  In this model, firms enter with identical beliefs regarding efficiency and 
update their beliefs after observing each period’s costs.  This results in some firms 
discovering that they entered too small and some discovering that they entered too large.  
However it implies that all firms enter with the same size in the initial period. This paper 
makes a closer examination of the entry and exit models proposed by Jovanovic (1982) 
and Ericson and Pakes (1995) and explores the implications of heterogeneous pre-entry 
beliefs, pre-entry experience, firm objective, and capacity adjustment costs.   
The assumption that entrants have identical beliefs before entering a market is 
highly unrealistic.  Indeed, one of the difficulties in the empirical analysis of firm entry is 
sample selection bias.  Firms that chose to enter have higher expected profits than firms 
than potential entrants that chose not to enter.  Entrants differ with regards to latent 
efficiency and beliefs regarding latent efficiency.  Accounting for heterogeneous prior 
efficiency beliefs results in firms entering with heterogeneous entry size.  Heterogeneous 
entry size in turn affects firm survival rates, with survival increasing in efficiency and 
accuracy of efficiency beliefs. 
Econometric analysis financial data from the California hospital market provides 
strong evidence supporting the predictions of this chapter’s model.  The previous work in 
this volume demonstrates that the California hospital market has experienced significant 
entry and exit over the last 30 years.  The first empirical analysis is a logit model of exit.  
I find that the hazard rate diminishes with entry capacity.  Firms that enter with no prior 
experience in the hospital market and firms that enter by constructing a new facility 
rather than acquiring a preexisting hospital facility also have a reduced hazard of exit.  
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However the roll of entry capacity varies systematically with both governance structure 
and entry experience and the role of entry experience varies systematically with 
governance structure.  The second empirical analysis explores the relationship between 
firm growth and entry experience.   
Background 
Early studies on firm entry and evolution were limited by availability of firm level 
data.  However, as more detailed data became available a significant number of 
unexpected patterns emerged regarding entry, growth and exit.  Among these was the 
observation that firms tend to enter markets small and that small firms grew faster than 
large firms.  This contradicts Gibrat’s longstanding law of proportional growth. 
A seminal study by Jovanovic (1982) explained deviations from Gibrats law 
through firm entry dynamics.  Jovanovic proposed that firms enter markets with some 
uncertainty regarding their own efficiency.  Firms enter believing that their efficiency is 
average.  As firms gain operating experience they receive signals regarding their 
efficiency.  Efficient firms grow more rapidly than incumbents to achieve the optimal 
operating scale, while underperforming firms grow slowly and ultimately chose to exit 
the market. 
Following Jovanovic, numerous firm level empirical studies of entry and exit 
were published, building a picture of firm entry and industry evolution.  The 
comprehensive reviews of the literature provided by Geroski (1995) and Siegfried and 
Evans (1994) summarize the findings of the literature and propose numerous stylized 
 87  
 
facts and results regarding entry and exit.  These findings, as well as those in the previous 
two chapters, motivate the model presented in this paper. 
While most firms enter small, there is significant heterogeneity in relative entry 
size.  The entry size of a firm is positively related to firm survival (Audretsch and 
Mahmood 1995 and Agarwal and Audretsch 20019, Evans (1987), Dunne et al. (1989), 
Levinsohn and Petropoulos (2000), and Bernard and Jensen (2002)).  Diversifying firms 
tend to enter new markets with larger capacity and market share than new firms.  Dunne 
et al. (1988) finds that diversifying firms entering with a new plant actually enter larger 
than diversifying firms entering with a preexisting plant.  This finding is due to their 
method of identifying new and old plants.  None of the reviewed entry literature 
differentiates between the acquisition of a preexisting plant and the construction of a new 
plant.  Chapter III above demonstrates that new plants tend to be smaller in scale than old 
plants. 
Klepper (2002), Dunne et al. (2005) and Mata et al. (1995) use the relationship 
between entry size and firm experience to motivate empirical work relating firm 
experience to firm survival.  Each study provides different conclusions regarding the role 
of experience in firm survival.  Klepper (2002) studied four important manufacturing 
industries that evolved into oligopolies over the course of the 20th century.  The role of 
experience differed for each industry, and  each industry experienced entrants were 
associated with lower hazard rates.  Dunne et al. (2005) expands the concept of 
                                                            
9 Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) actually identify two subgroups that experience relatively small 
advantages from entry size: mature industries and technologically intensive industries.  The consolidation 
presented in Chapter III suggests that the hospital industry is transitioning towards maturity.  The past two 
decades has also seen a significant increase in the technological intencity of the hospital industry. 
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experience to apply to both the firm and the manufacturing facility.  They find three 
distinct combinations of plant and firm experience that lead to distinct exit patterns.  
Experienced firms entering with experienced10 plants exit quickest followed by new firms 
operating new plants and experienced firms operating new plants.  However, the 
difference in survival between the last two categories was not significant.  Mata et al. 
(1995) find that new firm entrants actually have a higher probability of surviving than 
experienced plants.  Further, they find that initial size is more important for de novo 
entrants than experienced entrants. Mata et al. provide relatively little intuition for the 
higher survival rate of de novo entrants. 
Klepper’s (2002) theoretical treatment of entry assumes full information prior to 
entry.  Low productivity firms rationally enter early in the product lifecycle because 
prices are high.  However, as firms accumulate research and development efficient firms 
benefit from more substantial decreases in marginal cost.  Because of this low efficiency 
firms are forced out of the market.  Experienced firms are all assumed to be high 
productivity.  To my knowledge, the only theoretical treatment of heterogeneous 
uncertain entry is Cabral’s (1995) model of sunk cost and firm growth.  Cabral 
demonstrates that if costs are sunk and firms observe a signal regarding efficiency prior 
to investing in capacity than firms with more advantageous signals enter with larger 
capacity.  However, the model is highly stylized, relaxing the assumptions on firm costs 
results in an ambiguous relationship between efficiency and entry size. 
                                                            
10 As noted above, Dunne et al. (1988; 2005) categorizes experienced firms operating experienced plants as 
experienced firms diversifying plants that they already own.  The relatively high entry and exit could be 
driven by the low cost of entry and exit or firms choosing diversification for markets that have higher 
uncertainty. 
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While these authors demonstrate that entrant experience is a significant factor in 
firm survival they fail to explain why firms of equivalent experience have variation in 
entry size.  The key insights of previous work that drive the model below are that sunk 
costs in the presence of uncertainty influence firm entry size and that firm experience can 
play a key indicator of productivity. Unlike current models of uncertain efficiency in 
which entering firms have identical beliefs regarding the profitability of markets, this 
model proposes that entering firms receive a signal with noise regarding efficiency prior 
to choosing entry capacity.  Firms with more advantageous signals face smaller risk of 
failure. Because firm failure is associated with a loss of sunk costs firms with 
advantageous signals chose to enter with greater capacity. 
Firm Entry and Survival Model 
The empirical work summarized above identifies entry capacity as an important 
factor in firm survival but fails to identify why firms have heterogeneous entry size.  I 
propose that a key factor driving heterogeneity in entry decisions and post-entry 
performance is expected productivity and the degree of uncertainty involved in predicting 
productivity.  This model extends Jovanovic’s (1982) model of noisy selection in a 
number of directions.  I allow firms to have fuzzy knowledge of individual productivity 
prior to making entry decisions.  Because entering firms are heterogeneous, I treat entry 
with a greater level of attention.  To maintain consistency with the previous two chapters 
I base firm decisions on independent firm objective functions.  This last modification is 
motivated by two observations.  Chapter II provides evidence that not all firms share the 
same objective of profit maximization.  Chapter III indicates that governance structure 
may be related to firm exit decisions. 
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The model is developed in stages.  First, I identify firm objectives and the 
relationship between governance structure and objective.  Second, I develop the model of 
capacity and exit under the assumption of no sunk costs.  I then extend the model to allow 
for sunk costs.  Finally, before proceeding to the empirical analysis of the model, I 
introduce two secondary sources of uncertainty: plant level productivity and market 
demand.  
Firm Objectives 
This section establishes a basis for modeling firm objectives in a manner that is 
consistent with the previous two chapters.  Standard economic models of firms assume 
that firm decisions are based on the objective of maximizing profits.  While preference 
maximization is a reasonable primitive assumption for consumer behavior, it is not held 
as a primitive concept for firms (Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995).  The 
fundamental argument for assuming firms maximize profits is straight forward under the 
assumption of complete and competitive markets.  If prices are fixed, maximizing income 
is akin to maximizing preferences.  However, as the theorist moves away from the 
idealized world and towards the actual world this simple outcome is no longer valid. 
Thornton and Eakin (1992) provide a general theory of firm owners with non-
monetary objectives.  They show that owners absorb the discrepancy between the market 
value of assets and owner’s value as a shadow cost of achieving the non-monetary 
objectives.  This “virtual price” allows a tractable solution to the owner’s optimization 
problem.   
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The virtual price can be formulated as the difference between actual return on 
investment and maximal return on investment.  I represent heterogeneity in firm 
objectives as heterogeneity in required rate of return for capital.  The literature on 
hospital objectives posits two objectives that may result in a failure to maximize profit.  
The more altruistic objective is welfare maximization.  A second objective, and one that 
proves more tractable for my model, is employee welfare maximization.  Under 
employee welfare maximization employee extract rents from hospitals through greater 
than market wages.  This results in a quantity choice that is similar to profit 
maximization.  In monopolistically competitive markets, there is a direct tradeoff 
between return on investment and these alternate objectives. 
The nonprofit literature suggests that choosing a nonprofit governance structure 
lowers the marginal cost of non-monetary objectives.  It is generally accepted that non-
profit and government owned firms are more likely to pursue non-monetary objectives 
than for profit firms.  One of the simplifying assumptions that I make is that 
entrepreneurs self-select into firm governance structures based on their required rate of 
return.  Rather than basing firm decisions on a vector of outcomes covering multiple firm 
objectives firms chose a quantity to maximize profit subject to a minimum required 
return on capital.   
Not-for-profit hospitals remain in less profitable markets longer than for profit 
hospitals.  One common explanation for this is that a major non-monetary objective is 
access to care.  Increasing access to care beyond the profit maximizing level could result 
from operating at a size beyond the profit maximizing size to serve markets that are large 
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or operating at size smaller than the profit maximizing to serve markets that are small.  
Both choices would lead to lower returns on investment. 
This decision process is consistent with observed firm behavior.  Firms of all 
governance structures price services above marginal cost.  In general for-profit firms 
display the greatest markup ratios while government firms display the smallest markup 
ratios (see Chapter II).  Furthermore, not-for-profit and government firms of similar types 
have wider size distributions, with more small and large hospitals than for profits.  By 
segregating non-monetary objectives into required rate of return I can confine the 
heterogeneity in firm behavior to entry and exit decision.  This simplifies the operating 
behavior of firms to be effectively focused on profit maximization.  Modeling not-for-
profit and government firms as profit maximizing may appear inconsistent with the 
arguments presented in this section and the previous chapters.  However, it is consistent 
with the proposition of employee rent extraction and allowing for lower return on 
capitals, effectively increases the quantity of hospital service provided and thus social 
welfare.  This approach is also consistent with a qualitative view of non-monetary 
objectives.   
Chapter II demonstrates that the markup ratio, and consequently firm profit, is 
increasing with the weight that the firm places on profit over social welfare.  The 
econometric analysis in Chapter II provides evidence that government, not-for-profit, and 
for profit firms have progressively higher markup ratios.   In the analysis below, I assume 
that government, not-for-profit, and for profit firms have progressively increasing 
discount rates of ߜ௚ ൏ ߜ௡௣ ൏ ߜ௙௣.  This assumption is consistent with both the 
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econometric evidence already presented, and the empirical work presented in this 
chapter. 
Productivity 
An important factor in the profitability and survival of firms is productivity.  
Jovanovic (1982) and Ericson and Pakes (1995) both specify productivity as a firm 
specific attribute drawn from a known distribution.  In this model, I extend productivity 
along two dimensions.  First, I propose that firms have fuzzy knowledge of productivity 
prior to the commitment of large fixed costs.  Second, I propose that productivity is both 
firm and market specific.  The introduction of the second extension is delayed until after 
the model is fully developed and made primarily to motivate the empirical analysis. 
Firms are started and managed by people and no two people or groups of people 
are identical.  Differences in managerial skills, technical expertise, trade and professional 
networks and even political connections manifest within firms as differences in operating 
costs, market price and ultimately as differences in profit.  However, many unknown 
factors prevent a clear understanding of the relationship between a firm or potential 
firm’s observable characteristics and potential profit. 
Partners and co-owners as well as employees may misrepresent their skills to 
personal advantage.  Ego-guarding or self-deprecation may even result in 
misrepresentation of self-skills and characteristics.  Even perfect information regarding 
the skills and abilities of individuals involved within a business does provide perfect 
insight into firm profitability.  Every market, and in fact every firm, faces unique 
challenges in bringing a product to market and successfully transacting with customers.  
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In monopolistically competitive market consumer preference itself affects the 
profitability of a firm’s particular permutation of the product.   
Many of the attributes that contribute to firm productivity are evident prior to 
operating in a market.  Thus it is likely that new firms can estimate productivity prior to 
entry.  However, other factors influencing firm productivity are not observable and must 
be deduced from actual market performance.  As firms gain experience with a market, 
observing both cost and profitability, they receive further signals regarding their 
individual productivity. 
I model firm knowledge of productivity as a series of signals received prior to 
each round of market participation.  Every firm has a latent level of efficiency ܧ௙.  In the 
first stage of round t the firm receives a signal ௙ܺ௧~ܰሺܧ௙, ߪ௙ሻ.  The signal can be 
decomposed into true efficiency and signal error, or ௙ܺ௧ ൌ ܧ௙ ൅ ߝ௙௧ with ߝ௙௧~ܰሺ0, ߪ௙ሻ.  
For new firms the intuitive interpretation of this signal is based on entrepreneur and 
market characteristics.  The intuitive interpretation for incumbent firms is experience 
gained in the previous round.  The efficient estimate of ܧ௙ is ሼ∑ ௙ܺ௧ሽ/݊ ௡௧ୀଵ ൌ   ௙ܺതതത with 
standard deviation ߪ௙/√݊.  As firms gain market experience estimated efficiency 
converges on the true value and the variance of estimated efficiency diminishes.  
Diversifying firms have received more efficiency signals than new firms and 
consequently have a more accurate estimate of efficiency.     
Production 
 Let ߨሺ݀௙௧, ௙ܿ௧, ܧ௙, ߝ௙௧ሻ be the maximum profits earned by firm ݂ in period ݐ 
where ݀௙௧ is a vector of parameters characterizing the residual market demand that firm ݂ 
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faces and ௙ܿ௧ is the firm’s capacity.  The residual demand function represents the demand 
curve that the firm faces, accounting for the output of other firms in the market.  In a 
monopoly setting the residual demand is also the market demand.  The signal error ߝ௙௧ is 
included in the profit function to prevent firms from deriving ܧ௙ through observation of 
profit.  Two possible interpretations of ߝ௙௧ are as a firm specific cost shock or a firm 
specific demand shock.  
Capacity is the primary choice variable of the firm.  Insufficient capacity restricts 
output and results in higher operating costs.  Excess capacity reduces return on 
investment and requires higher maintenance costs. The optimal level of capacity, ௙ܿ௧כ , 
depends on the firm’s particular level of ݀௙௧ and ܧ௙.  Optimal capacity increase with both 
residual demand and firm efficiency.   The relationship between optimal capacity, 
residual demand and firm efficiency is given by ௙ܿ௧כ ൌ ௙ܿכሺ݀௙௧, ܧ௙ሻ.  Conditional on the 
firm operating at optimal capacity, profits are taken to be increasing in the size of the 
market and firm efficiency. 
 Hospital capacity has been demonstrated to play an important role in health 
outcomes (Matsuo et al. 2000) and hospital profitability (Harper 2002).  Profitability is 
restricted by insufficient capacity due as a result of higher operating costs and lower total 
volume of services provided.  Profitability is restricted by excess capacity due to excess 
capital costs and lower prices (Harper 2000). 
If costs are not sunk then firms are free to adjust capacity each period to reflect 
current beliefs regarding firm efficiency and market demand.  Investment in capacity is 
returned upon reduction in capacity and result in an equivalent increase of the firm’s 
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scrap value.  If the firm choses to operate it must be the case that the investment in 
capacity earned returns equal to or higher than the firm’s discount rate.  Thus regardless 
of expectations about future periods if the firm choses to operate in the current period the 
firm selects an operating capacity based on known residual demand and expected firm 
efficiency ௙ܺ௧തതതത,  or ௙ܿכሺ݀௙௧, ௙ܺ௧തതതതሻ.  The expected value of profit in any future period ݐ ൅ ݆ is 
ܧൣߨ൫݀௙௧ା௝, ௙ܿ௧ା௝כ , ܧ௙൯൧ ൌ ߨ௘൫݀௙௧ା௝, ௙ܿ௧ା௝כ ሺ݀௙௧ା௝, ௙ܺ௧തതതതሻ, ௙ܺ௧തതതത൯.The firm will chose to operate 
if the net present value of expected future profits is greater that the firm’s scrap value: 
∑ గ೐ቀௗ೑೟శೕ,௖೑೟శೕכ ,௑೑೟തതതതതቁಮೕసబ
ሺଵାఋሻೕ ൐ ݏ௧.  Because ௙ܿ௧כ  is increasing in ௙ܺ௧തതതത and ߨሺ·ሻ is increasing in both 
ܿ௜௧כ  and ௙ܺ௧തതതത there must be some critical level of ௙ܺ௧തതതത denoted ௙ܺ௧തതതത෢  such that all firms with 
௙ܺ௧തതതത ൐ ௙ܺ௧തതതത෢   will chose to operate.  
 Consider the evolution of a cohort of entrants facing constant residual 
demand.  Firms will enter if ௙ܺ௧തതതത ൐ ௙ܺതതത෢, or ܧ௙ ൅ ߝ௙௧തതതത ൐ ௙ܺതതത෢.  Some firms with ܧ௙ ൐ ௙ܺ଴തതതത෢  will 
fail to enter while some firms with ܧ௙ ൏ ௙ܺതതത෢ will erroneously enter.  The estimated 
estimate of firm efficiency conditional on entry is positively biased.  Because ௙ܺ௧തതതത is 
continually distributed ௙ܿ௧ will also be continually distributed and bounded below by 
௙ܿכሺ݀௙, ௙ܺതതത෢ሻ.  Each period firms remaining in the cohort receive a new signal. Firms 
receiving signals smaller than prior productivity estimates will reduce capacity while 
firms receiving signals larger than prior productivity estimates grow. If the new signal is 
sufficiently small the firm will chose to exit ௑೑೟శభ௡ ൏ ௙ܺതതത෢ െ ௙ܺ௧തതതത כ
௡ିଵ
௡ , alternately 
ఌ೑೟శభ
௡ ൏
௙ܺതതത෢ െ ܧ௙ െ ߳௙௧തതതത כ ௡ିଵ௡ .  As ݊ increases, the weight placed on the new signal diminishes, 
thus older firms are less likely to exit.  Firms with lower levels of ௙ܺ௧ିଵതതതതതതത and lower levels 
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of ܧ௙ will be more likely to exit.  Firms with high average signal error are more likely to 
exit.   
The average value of ܧ௙ for the cohort increases over time as a greater portion of 
firms with low levels of ܧ௙ exit.  However, ௙ܺ௧തതതത converges to ܧ௙, firms that initially 
overestimated efficiency revise beliefs, and subsequently capacity down, while firms that 
underestimated efficiency revise capacity up.  , the residual demand that the firm faces 
may also change over time.   
Allowing residual demand to vary over time enriches the possible dynamics of 
firm size and survival.  Increasing residual demand increases optimal capacity.  As 
efficient firms increase capacity, and subsequently quantity, residual demand for 
inefficient firms decreases, increasing the exit rate of inefficient firms.  Factors affecting 
residual demand could include the number of firms in the market, the population, 
available substitutes and for the hospital industry, the general health of the population.  If 
residual demand is growing via firm exit and population growth then firm size would 
trend up over time.  
Table 17 compares the age of exiting hospital firms with a simulation of the 
model above using 100,000 firms with random samples of ܧ௙~ܰሺ0,1ሻ  and 
௙ܺ௧~ܰሺܧ௙, 1ሻ.  Exit is based on the rule ௙ܺതതത෢ ൏ .95.  The exit percentage is calculated with 
firms that entered before 2000 and exited during the study period.  The data are trimmed 
in this way guarantee that the data do not contain censored exit or entry.  Exit percentage 
is calculated by dividing the number of firms that exited the market at a particular age 
divided by the number of firms in the trimmed data.   
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Table 0.1 
Table 17: Exit Rate by Age 
Age Simulated 
Exit 
Actual 
Exit 
1 0.257 0.241 
2 0.122 0.155 
3 0.078 0.081 
4 0.052 0.067 
5 0.040 0.030 
6 0.033 0.034 
7 0.025 0.027 
8 0.022 0.032 
9 0.019 0.027 
10 0.017 0.027 
 
Introducing sunkness of cost increases the significance of efficiency uncertainty. 
Capacity investments have a cost of ݒሺ ௙ܿ௧, ௙ܿ௧ିଵሻ, while capacity reduction returns 
ݎ൫ ௙ܿ௧, ௙ܿ௧ିଵ൯  with ݎ൫ ௙ܿ௧, ௙ܿ௧ିଵ൯ ൏ ݒ൫ ௙ܿ௧, ௙ܿ௧ିଵ൯.  The firm’s maximization problem is 
now considerably more complex because it must now base the choice of ܿ௜௧  on its 
expectations of future capacity changes, which in turn depend on both demand 
expectations and productivity signals.   
 Overestimating optimal capacity imposes an additional cost that increases 
with the degree of sunkness.  Suppose residual demand remains constant, so that ௙ܿ௧כ ൌ
௙ܿכ.  If the firm over invests in capacity the first period by ∆ܿ with ௙ܿ଴௢ ൌ ௙ܿכ ൅ ∆ܿ ൐ ௙ܿכ 
and corrects this the next period it incurs the additional cost ݒ൫ ௙ܿ଴௢ , 0൯ െ ݒ൫ ௙ܿכ, 0൯ െ
௥ቀ௖೑బ೚ ,௖೑כቁ
ଵାఋ ൅ ߨ൫݀௙, ௙ܿכ, ܧ௙, ߝ௙௧൯ െ ߨ൫݀௙, ௙ܿ଴௢ , ܧ௙, ߝ௙௧൯. If the firm underinvests in capacity by 
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∆ܿ with ௙ܿ଴௨ ൌ ௙ܿכ െ ∆ܿ ൐ ௙ܿכ and corrects this the next period the firm incurs additional 
costs of ݒ൫ ௙ܿ଴௢ , 0൯ ൅ ௩ቀ௖೑
כ,஼೑బ೚ ቁ
ଵାఋ െ ݒ൫ ௙ܿכ൯ ൅ ߨ൫݀௙, ௙ܿכ, ܧ௙, ߝ௙௧൯ െ ߨ൫݀௙, ௙ܿ௧௨ , ܧ௙, ߝ௙௧൯.   
These costs can be decomposed into two parts, excess capacity change costs and 
operating profit costs.  The capacity change costs from over investing depends on the 
difference between the cost to increase capacity and the value regained from decreasing 
capacity.  In the case of hospitals, decreasing capacity may consist of closing a wing or 
floor, which essentially returns no value.  The capacity change costs from under investing 
depend on the concavity of the capacity investment function.  If there are constant returns 
to scale in capacity investment the capacity change costs from under investing are 
negative due to discounting.  Increasing returns to scale is a more reasonable assumption, 
and leads firms to incorporate future increases in optimal capacity into the current 
capacity choice. 
 
Data 
 The predictions of this model are compared to statistical results using a 33 year 
panel from Californian hospitals.  The two sources used in constructing this panel come 
from California's Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) 
Annual Hospital Financial Data and the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  The description 
of the Annual Hospital Financial Data and its construction into a useable panel is located 
in section 3.3 above.  County population and personal income, both provided by BEA, 
are included in the panel to control for variations in demand.   
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The unit of observation is an owner operating a hospital in a given year.  Capacity 
is defined as the number of licensed hospital beds for a given hospital.  Market exit 
occurs when a hospital changes owners or when a hospital ceases to provide service.  
Because this study is interested in firm efficiency it is necessary to focus on the exit of 
firms rather than the exit of facilities.  Experience at entry is measured in several ways.  
The first is the number of years the firm has operated.  The second is the number of 
hospitals that the firm operates.  The third is the preexistence of the firm prior to entry.  
The last measure of experience is the preexistence of the hospital prior to entry.  The 
preexistence of the firm prior to entry is implied by strictly positive years of experience 
prior to entry.  However, this analysis distinguishes between the two to allow for a richer 
interaction between experience and survival.  
A graphical overview of firm survival patterns is presented in figures 15 through 
17.11  The survival rate in year t is the percentage of entrents of a particular type 
operating after t years in the market.  Contrary to expectations, the survival of new firms 
is similar to survival of preexisting firms and the survival rate of new hospitals is actually 
higher than the survival rate for old hospitals.  Not-for-profit firms have a lower survival 
rate than government owned firms, and for profit firms have a lower survival rate than 
both government and not-for-profit firms.  This is consistent with the assumption that 
required rate of return is related to profit status.  These figures do not account for the fact 
that firms of different types enter with different capacity.  Figure 15 shows an inverted u 
                                                            
11 A new firm is defined as a firm that was not observed in the data set prior entering a speficic hospital 
market. A pre-existing or encombant firm is a firm that operated in another Californian hospital market in 
prior years.  Note that under this definition new firms may include firms that existed prior to entry but 
operated hospitals in markets outside California.  The inclusion of some experienced firms as new firms 
will reduce the observed difference between new firms and pre-existing firms.  New hospitals are hospital 
facilities that did not exist prior to the firm entering the market, while pre-existing hospitals are hospitals 
that existed prior to entry but were operated by a different owner. 
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relationship between the log of firm size and years in the market.   Chapter III identified 
that diversifying firms enter significantly larger than incumbent firms.  The survival 
advantage of incumbent firms is realized primarily through entry size. 
 
Figure 15. Survival Rate of New Firms 
 
Figure 16. Survival Rate of New Hospitals 
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Figure 17. Survival Rate by Ownership Type 
 
Figure 18. Survival and Entry Capacity 
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The model presented above suggests that initial capacity can provide a signal for 
efficient firms.  Furthermore, because inexperienced firms have a larger positive bias for 
entry efficiency, the predictive power of capacity is smaller for new firms and new 
hospitals.  New hospitals and new firms will exit at different rates than diversifying firms 
and preexisting hospitals.  Firms that reduce capacity after entry overestimated efficiency 
and may ultimately exit while firms that increase capacity are likely to have under 
estimated efficiency and thus, are unlikely to exit. 
Table 18 contains estimation results for Cox proportional hazard model of firm 
exit.  The Cox proportional hazard model assumes that firms face a base line time 
dependent hazard function ߣ଴ሺݐሻ that is multiplicatively effecte by firm level attributes so 
that the hazard function follows the form ߣሺݐ|ܺሻ ൌ ߣ଴ሺݐሻ݁ఉ`௑ where ܺ is a vecter of firm 
attributes.  I estimate this model using market exit as the dependent hazard variable.  The 
hazard of exit is explained by firm and hospital experience, firm governance structure, 
entry capacity, and market demand.This model restricts the determinants of exit to firm 
entry characteristics.  Across all specifications in table 18, larger entry is associated with 
higher survival rates.  This is true even after conditioning on market size and firm 
experience.  As predicted, the relationship between entry capacity and survival is smaller 
for less experienced firms and hospitals.  The years of experience that a firm has when 
they enter a market is also a significant determinant of survival.  Because the model 
conditions on firm capacity, which is a proxy for expected efficiency, the higher survival 
rate of more experienced entrants is an indication that experienced firms can more 
accurately predict their profitability.  
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System size, or the number of hospitals owned by a particular firm, is positively 
related to firm survival.  This can be explained by either cost advantages due to 
multiplant economies or by system size being another proxy for firm efficiency. 
New firms and new establishments have higher survival rates.  The result is 
counter to most research thus far, however it is consistent with Mata et. al's work on firm 
experience and survival.  Interacting the new firm dummy with profit status in columns 2 
and 3 reveals that government hospitals receive the largest de novo survival advantage.  
There are a number of potential explanations for why new firms and new hospitals have 
higher survival rates.  The increased survival rate of new firms and hospitals is likely due 
to unobserved variables.  Health care technology is rapidly evolving.  Investment in old 
hospitals represents investment in old technologies.  Exit represents an acknowledgement 
of a mistake.  Behavioral economics finds that error aversion, like other non-traditional 
behavioral patterns, diminishes with repetition.  The survival advantage of new firms and 
hospitals represents an important direction for future research. 
Under the logarithmic model entry size is only a significant predictor of survival for 
experienced firms (columns 1-3) and government hospitals (column 5).  Survival 
increases more rapidly for new firms than it does for old firms.  Firm age increases 
survival rates, however it increases survival rate faster for new firms than it does for old 
firms.  These results are similar to the models prediction that experience in the market has 
a greater effect for less experienced firms.  Not-for-profit and for profit firms both have 
lower survival rates and greater entry capacity advantage than government firms.  Both 
observations are consistent with government, not-for-profit and for profit firms having 
progressively higher profit seeking motive. 
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Table 0.2 
Table 18: Cox Proportional Hazard of Market Exit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
New Firm -0.202** -1.939*** -1.767*** -1.641** 
(0.0865) (0.509) (0.510) (0.778) 
New Establishment -0.335*** -1.956*** -1.588*** -1.812** 
(0.103) (0.549) (0.554) (0.849) 
New Firm*Non-profit 0.803*** 0.812*** 1.169* 
(0.288) (0.276) (0.678) 
New Firm*For Profit 1.072*** 0.960*** 0.762 
(0.278) (0.267) (0.665) 
New Est.*Non-profit 0.123 0.00349 0.342 
(0.294) (0.291) (0.682) 
New Est.*For Profit 0.941*** 0.835*** 0.657 
(0.259) (0.256) (0.661) 
Non-profit -1.119 0.480** 
(1.022) (0.196) 
For Profit -0.0265 1.088*** 
(0.945) (0.189) 
Ln(Entry Size) -0.208*** -0.335*** -0.332*** -0.410** -0.124***
(0.0452) (0.0733) (0.0747) (0.185) (0.0473) 
Ln(Entry Size)*New 
Firm 0.160* 0.144 0.115 
(0.0927) (0.0932) (0.0935) 
Ln(Entry Size)*New 
Est. 0.255** 0.193 0.242* 
(0.119) (0.118) (0.127) 
Ln(Firm age at entry) -0.131*** -0.113** -0.0913* -0.0669 -0.0166 
(0.0487) (0.0514) (0.0513) (0.0518) (0.0405) 
Ln(System Size) -0.0817** -0.0685** -0.0967*** -0.0779**
(0.0344) (0.0337) (0.0344) (0.0319) 
Ln(Entry Size)*Non-
Profit 0.176 
(0.199)  
Ln(Entry Size)*For 
Profit 0.103 
(0.185)  
Market controls No No Yes No No 
Observations 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 1,033 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 0.3 
Table 19: Logit Regression of Market Exit 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
New Firm 0.0392 -2.313*** -2.242*** -1.849** 
(0.0707) (0.465) (0.466) (0.833) 
New Establishment -0.496*** -2.614*** -2.669*** -1.903** 
(0.102) (0.583) (0.583) (0.944) 
New Firm*Non-profit 0.312 0.251 0.905 
(0.199) (0.199) (0.707) 
New Firm*For Profit 0.665*** 0.510*** 0.369 
(0.190) (0.195) (0.701) 
New Est.*Non-profit 0.336 0.273 0.584 
(0.306) (0.306) (0.731) 
New Est.*For Profit 1.210*** 1.154*** 0.799 
(0.280) (0.281) (0.726) 
Non-profit 1.160 2.354*** 
(0.965) (0.752) 
For Profit 2.167** 2.983*** 
(0.919) (0.714) 
Ln(Entry Size) -0.206*** -0.403*** -0.462*** 0.0253 0.391*** 
(0.0428) (0.0752) (0.0782) (0.164) (0.143) 
Ln(Entry Size)*New Firm 0.402*** 0.413*** 0.345*** 
(0.0924) (0.0923) (0.0941) 
Ln(Entry Size)*New Est. 0.327*** 0.356*** 0.224* 
(0.114) (0.113) (0.120) 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.152** -0.149** 0.0361 -0.260*** 
(0.0640) (0.0653) (0.0791) (0.0395) 
New Firm*Ln(Firm Age) -0.268*** -0.279*** -0.433*** 
(0.0794) (0.0801) (0.0909) 
New Hospital*Ln(Firm Age) 0.00268 -0.0108 -0.103 
(0.103) (0.104) (0.104) 
Ln(System Size) -0.218*** -0.214*** -0.271*** -0.153*** 
(0.0379) (0.0380) (0.0396) (0.0318) 
Ln(Entry Size)*Non-Profit -0.393** -0.470*** 
(0.167) (0.158) 
Ln(Entry Size)*For Profit -0.402** -0.464*** 
(0.159) (0.151) 
Market controls No No Yes No Yes 
Observations 7,895 7,895 7,895 7,895 7,895 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Two additional measures of entry size, entrant relative size and entrant relative 
size by governance structure, generate similar results.  However, scaling relative size by 
governance structure weakens the magnitude and significance of both the governance 
dummies and the governance interaction terms.  The models are estimated with relative 
size by redefining capacity as relative capacity, or the ratio of hospital capacity to 
average hospital capacity.   
The results presented above are consistent across numerous robustness checks.  
The logit model of exit is robust to specifying a probit distribution.  Chapter III indicates 
that hospital exit patterns changed after 1991.  Restricting the data to post 1991 entry 
does not change the sign or weaken the significance of any of the key explanatory 
variables.  Restricting the data to short term general hospitals also has little effect on the 
results. 
The survival model presented in this chapter predicts that firms with greater 
uncertainty regarding productivity will enter relatively small and grow relatively fast.   
New firms, new establishments, younger firms and smaller firms are expected to have 
greater uncertainty regarding productivity.  Table 20 presents estimation results for the 
determinants of capacity growth.  New firms are the only category of firms that do not 
follow expected growth patterns.   
Growth decreases with firm age.  This is consistent with the idea that productivity 
beliefs become more certain with experience.  The relationship between establishment 
age and growth was assessed both independently and in conjunction with firm age.  In 
both cases establishment age does not significantly affect growth rates. 
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Exit Markets is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the year that firms exit 
markets.  Firms that exit the market tend to have lower levels of growth.  This is 
consistent with the prediction that firms which exit slowly revise productivity estimates 
down.   
Table 0.4 
Table 20. Entrant Experience and Hospital Capacity 
Growth 
New Firm -0.033 
 (0.016)** 
New Establishment 0.064 
 (0.017)*** 
Ln(Firm Age) -0.046 
 (0.009)*** 
Not-for-profit 0.046 
 (0.008)*** 
For Profit 0.045 
 (0.011)*** 
Entry Size/100 -0.005 
 (0.002)** 
Exits Market -0.088 
 (0.014)*** 
Constant 0.072 
 (0.021)*** 
Multi-Hospital Firm -0.052 
 (0.016)*** 
County Demand Controls Yes 
R2 0.03 
N 6,390 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
Owner/facilities that enter as new hospitals are more likely to exit, and 
owner/facilities that enter as new owners are more likely to exit.  The relationship 
between hospital experience and exit is statistically insignificant.  Higher entry capacity 
reduces the likelihood of exit for firms with entry experience, but has no effect on new 
 109  
 
hospitals and a positive effect on new firms.  Thus firms that enter without experience 
should enter small while firms that enter with experience should enter with larger 
capacity.   
 
 
Conclusion 
The hospital industry is unique from other industries in that it is a service industry 
with relatively large fixed facility costs and a broad mixture of governance structures.  
Because hospital facilities serve a relatively specialized function investment in hospital 
capacity is relatively sunk.  This makes the initial capacity choice of a firm critical to 
firm survival.  Consistent with other industries, hospitals that enter with larger capacities 
have lower hazards of exit.  Capacity plays a much smaller roll for new firms and 
facilities.  This is consistent with inexperienced firms making more errors with regards to 
optimal entry size.   
Unlike previous research (Klepper [2002], Dunne et al. [2005] and Mata et al. 
[1995]) new hospitals and new firms have higher survival rates.  Identifying the reason 
for this survival advantage could provide useful insight to the firm entry and exit 
decision.  The greater risk associated with new entry they may result in a large wedge 
between the minimum expected productivity of experienced entrants and the minimum 
expected productivity of inexperienced entrants.  This difference is not observable from 
entry capacity alone because the higher variance of expected productivity for 
inexperienced firms will also place downward pressure on entry capacity.  
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If inexperienced firms are in fact entering with conservative capacity but higher 
expected productivity they would have higher growth rates than experienced entrants.  
New hospitals, even after conditioning for demand characteristics, have higher growth 
rates than entrants purchasing established hospitals.  However, new firms grow slower 
than diversifying firms.  This indicates that market specific uncertainty plays a different 
role than firm specific uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER V 
GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE IN THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY 
This dissertation has explored several major themes in relationship to governance 
structure in the hospital industry.  I have introduced governance structure as a defining 
characteristic in the theory of the firm and the empirical analysis of firm behavior.  A 
substantial and growing portion of US firms are organized under some form of not-for-
profit governance structure.  This sector of the economy has experienced higher 
employment and salary growth than the for profit sector between 2000 and 2010 [Roeger, 
Blackwood, and Pettijohn, 2012].  The growing diversity in the form of firm governance 
structure makes research regarding governance structure, and the not-for-profit 
distinction in particular, meaningful and relevant to firm owners, firm management, 
government policy makers and academics. 
 Chapter II develops a body of evidence identifying heterogeneous firm objectives.  
Firm objective plays a critical role in many decision making processes.  Government 
treatment of firms in uncompetitive markets depends on firm objective.  Market 
expectations and the investment and production decisions that depend on them are based 
on firm objectives.  Firms that act according to welfare increasing objectives can be 
identified through their actions.   
 Not-for-profit hospital firms price goods with a significantly smaller markup over 
marginal cost than for profit firms.  This is consistent with not-for-profit firms having 
objective functions with greater weight placed on social welfare.  Religious based not-
for-profit hospitals have even smaller markup ratios than corporate not-for-profits.   
 Chapter III identifies numerous patterns in entry, exit, and the evolution of the 
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hospital industry.  Entry and exit in the hospital industry follow patterns that are similar 
to those found in the manufacturing industry.  However, there are a few key differences 
that identify a different underlying data generating process.  First, facilities enter and exit 
at a significantly lower rate in the hospital industry.  This is likely due to the maturity of 
the industry and the significant sunk costs of facility entry.  Firms enter and exit specific 
markets at more comparable rates to manufacturing firms.  However, not-for-profit and 
government firms enter and exit at progressively smaller rates than for profits, indicating 
a greater willingness to invest and remain in low profitability markets.   
 The entry and exit rates of hospitals, as well as relative size at entry and exit, are 
significantly different across pre-entry firm experience.  Less experienced firms enter 
with smaller scale, especially when by constructing a new facility.  One explanation, 
which is explored in Chapter IV, is that market and firm level uncertainty lead 
inexperienced firms to enter at smaller rates than experienced firms. 
 Chapter IV explores the relationship between hospital experiences, facility 
experience, and firm survival.  The model developed extends Jovanovich’s model of 
uncertain firm productivity to allow for heterogeneous post-entry beliefs.  This extension 
results in firm’s entering with different capacity, and with entry capacity having 
predictive power over firm survival.   
 Two empirical models of firm survival are estimated using the California hospital 
data.  The results indicate that after accounting for hospital entry characteristics, new 
firms and new facilities have a higher rate of survival than experienced firms.  Entry size 
is positively related to firm survival.  This relationship is weak for firms with less entry 
experience.  The relationship between entrant experience, entry size and firm survival is 
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consistent with the theoretical model of heterogeneous firm entry beliefs. 
 This work identifies a number of important avenues for future research.  The 
consolidation of the Californian hospital industry and the changing patterns of entry over 
the last 35 years points to a structural change in the market.  Two important factors have 
been identified as a change in Medicare reimbursement policies and the development of 
managed care insurance providers.  The Affordable Care Act of 2010 will introduce a 
third major structural break in the hospital industry.  This dissertation identifies that 
governance structure will play a critical role in how this act affects the hospital industry. 
 The demographics of the California hospital market have evolved considerably 
over the study period.  In addition California’s regulatory oversight of hospital entry has 
diminished.  One potential direction for future work is to identify how these changes have 
affected the structure of the hospital industry. 
 Finally, I have demonstrated that there are many significant differences in firm 
objectives and behaviors.  One factor in these differences is the governance structure that 
the firm operates under.  However I have also shown that firm behavior is heterogeneous 
within governance structures.  For government policy to effectively address differences 
between firms, policy makers need a more accurate way to identify firm type.  A fruitful 
area for future work will be to investigate how firms self-select into different governance 
structures and to investigate what drives differences between firms within the same 
governance structure. 
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